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Abstract
Can U.S. patent law help American businesses compete in global
markets? In early 2011, President Barack Obama argued that, to obtain
economic prosperity, the United States must “out-innovate . . . the rest of
the world,”1 and that patent reform is a “critical dimension[]”2 of this
innovation agenda. Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the most sweeping
reforms to U.S. patent law in more than half a century, contending that the
changes will “give American inventors and innovators the 21st century
patent system they need to compete.”3 Surprisingly, no legal scholar has
assessed whether patent reform is capable of making American firms more
competitive in global markets.
This Article begins to fill this void by examining whether U.S. patent
law can provide U.S. innovators with enhanced incentives to invent. This
Article argues that traditional approaches to improving U.S. patent law,
including the recent patent reform act, likely will do little to help
Americans invent more than their foreign rivals. Nevertheless, helping
U.S. businesses compete in global markets is vital to our economic
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1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan. 25,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-presidentstate-union-address.
2. NAT’L ECONOMIC COUNCIL, ET AL., A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: SECURING
OUR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 2 (Feb. 2011).
3. Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Comment of Senator Leahy on the Senate Motion
to Proceed to the America Invents Act (Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/
press/comment-of-senator-leahy-on-the-senate-motion-to-proceed-to-the-america-invents-act.
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prosperity, as we face a crippling recession, declining innovation capacity,
and increasing pressure from foreign competition. Accordingly, this Article
argues that federal lawmakers should consider nontraditional approaches to
U.S. patent law, including using law to foster a culture in the United States
that promotes innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
For over a century, the United States has been one of the most
innovative countries in the world.4 U.S. inventors pioneered the airplane,5
4. See, e.g., JUDY ESTRIN, CLOSING THE INNOVATION GAP: REIGNITING THE SPARK OF
CREATIVITY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 71 (2009) (asserting that in the 1970s the United States was
technologically preeminent); Rep. Lamar Smith, Pass Patent Reform to Create Jobs, POLITICO.COM
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the electric light bulb,6 the polio vaccine,7 the transistor,8 the personal
computer,9 and the Internet.10 Indeed, in 2005, the National Council on
Competitiveness (a nonpartisan and nongovernmental organization
composed of CEOs, university presidents, and labor leaders) proclaimed
that “[i]nnovation has always been deep in America’s soul.”11
Recently, however, many commentators have voiced fears that
America’s innovation position is starting to erode.12 By some measures, it
appears that the United States is not as focused on innovation as some
countries.13 For example, Europe, not the United States, now hosts the
(Mar. 30, 2011, 4:47 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/52141.html (“American
inventors have led the world in innovations for more than a century.”); see also John C. Lechleiter,
America’s Growing Innovation Gap, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10
001424052748704111704575354863772223910.html (“America is the inventing nation.”); Fareed
Zakaria, The Future of American Innovation: Can America Keep Pace?, TIME (June 5, 2011), http:/
/www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2075226,00.html (“Innovation is as American as apple
pie.”).
5. U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (filed Mar. 23, 1903) (describing a “flying machine”). This
patent issued to “Orville Wright and Wilbur Wright, citizens of the United States, residing in the
city of Dayton, county of Montgomery, and State of Ohio.” Id.
6. U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 4, 1878) (describing an “electric lamp”). This patent
issued to “Thomas Alva Edison of Menlo Park, in the State of New Jersey, United States of
America.” Id.
7. Jonas Salk was born in New York City and developed the polio vaccine in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. JANE S. SMITH, PATENTING THE SUN: POLIO AND THE SALK VACCINE 102 (1990).
8. Three Americans—John Bardeen, Walter Brattain, and William Shockley—developed the
transistor at Bell Labs in the 1940s. See David B. Haviland, The Transistor in a Century of
Electronics, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Dec. 19, 2002), http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/physics/tran
sistor/history/. For their work, Bardeen, Brattain, and Shockley received the Nobel Prize in Physics
in 1956. THE NOBEL PRIZE IN PHYSICS 1956, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics
/laureates/1956/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
9. Inventor of the Week: The Personal Computer, LEMELSON-MIT (Apr. 2007),
http://web.mit.edu/invent/iow/apple.html.
10. JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 1–2 (1999).
11. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, INNOVATE AMERICA: NATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVE
SUMMIT AND REPORT 8 (2005) [hereinafter “INNOVATE AMERICA”]; COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS,
About Us, http://www.compete.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
12. See, e.g., NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, IS AMERICA FALLING OFF THE FLAT EARTH? 17–20
(2007) (arguing that the United States is doing poorly in “the global competition for jobs”); ESTRIN,
supra note 4, at 4–5 (arguing that “America has lost the core values that were the catalysts of its
[innovation] success”); JOHN KAO, INNOVATION NATION: HOW AMERICA IS LOSING ITS INNOVATION
EDGE, WHY IT MATTERS, AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO GET IT BACK 2 (2007) (asserting that America’s
“capacity for innovation is eroding”); INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 38; NAT’L ACADS.
PRESS, RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM, REVISITED 5 (2010) [hereinafter “GATHERING STORM,
REVISITED”]; Gary P. Pisano & Willy C. Shih, Restoring American Competitiveness, HARV. BUS.
REV., July 2009, at 114–16; Lechleiter, supra note 4; see also MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 12 (1990) (“America, with skilled labor, preeminent
scientists, and ample capital, has seen eroding export market share in industries where one would
least expect it, such as machine tools, semiconductors, and sophisticated electronic products.”).
13. See, e.g., infra notes 72–102 and accompanying text.
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largest particle accelerator in the world.14 The United States is also
investing less in innovation than other countries, ranking eighth in the
world in spending on research and development as a percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP).15 In 2000, the United States led the world in the
deployment of broadband Internet, but by 2007, the United States ranked
sixteenth.16 Similarly, U.S. citizens are focusing less on careers related to
innovation than citizens of many other countries. U.S. educational
performance related to science and engineering is notoriously mediocre.17
“U.S. high school students underperform most of the world in international
science and math tests,”18 and the United States ranks seventeenth in the
world in high school graduation rate.19 Student performances during
college and after college are similar: the United States ranks fourteenth in
the world in college graduation rate, and thirteenth in the world in doctoral
graduation rates.20 The United States does not lead the world in the number
of researchers per capita,21 and even U.S. companies are offshoring their
research and development efforts.22 General Electric, a company founded
by American Thomas Edison,23 now has more research and development
employees located outside of the United States than within it.24 General
Electric is not alone. According to the National Science Foundation, almost
14. Alex L. Pasternack, World’s Largest Particle Accelerator Offers Window into Laws of
Nature, CNN.COM (May 17, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/innovation/05/11/
motherboard.hadron.collider/index.html; Brian Vastag, Tevatron Atom Smasher’s Close Ends Era
of Big Science, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/tevatron-atom-smashers-close-in-illinois-ends-era-of-big-science/2011/09/29/gIQAR9SK8
K_story.html.
15. Main Science and Technology Indicators Database, OECD, 1, 14–17 (June 2012),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/52/47406944.pdf. Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland,
Israel, Japan, and South Korea all spend more on research and development as a percentage of GDP
than the United States spends. Id. at 15.
16. ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 151.
17. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 30–34.
18. INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 49; see also Staying Competitive, NAT’L MATH +
SCIENCE
INITIATIVE,
http://www.nationalmathandscience.org/solutions/challenges/stayingcompetitive (last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (reporting alarming statistics regarding the performance of
U.S. schools vis-à-vis foreign educational systems).
19. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 19.
20. Id.; New Doctorate Graduates, OECD ILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
sites/sti_scoreboard-2011-en/02/01/index.html?contentType=&itemId=/content/book/sti_scoreboar
d-2011-en&containerItemId=/content/book/sti_scoreboard-2011-en&accessItemIds=&mimeType=
text/html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). To make matters worse, the United States ranks twenty-sixth in
the world in the percentage of doctoral degrees that are awarded in science and engineering. Id.
21. Main Science and Technology Indicators Database, supra note 15.
22. See Pisano & Shih, supra note 12, at 116.
23. Thomas Edison & GE, GE.COM, http://www.ge.com/company/history/edison.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2013).
24. Ron Hira, U.S. Workers in a Global Job Market, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. ONLINE (Spring
2009), http://www.issues.org/25.3/hira.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
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a quarter of all research and development workers employed by U.S.
companies work outside of the United States.25
Unfortunately, the weakening of American innovation could not come
at a worse time, as the United States struggles to overcome a crippling
economic recession.26 Innovation and economic prosperity are closely
linked in that “innovation provides the fuel for economic expansion.”27
Indeed, economists estimate that innovation accounts for the majority of
growth in the U.S. economy.28 Innovation also has a significant impact on
competition within global markets, and today many markets are global
because “aviation and telecommunication revolutions have conspired to
make distance increasingly irrelevant.”29 In these global markets, domestic
businesses will often lose market share to more innovative foreign
competitors. As the National Academy of Science, the National Academy
of Engineers, and the Institute of Medicine stated in 2010, “A nation that
does not embrace innovation will soon be left behind in the 21st century
economy.”30
Because of the connection between innovation and domestic economic
prosperity, our political leaders have argued that America should refocus
its attention on innovation to overcome its recent economic woes.
Specifically, U.S. politicians contend that American innovation will help
U.S. businesses capture greater shares of global markets. For example, in
his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama argued: “The future
is ours to win. But to get there, we can’t just stand still.”31 President
Obama noted that other countries have made great technological progress
and urged Americans to “out-innovate . . . the rest of the world.”32 The
Obama Administration later stated that patent law is a “critical”
25. Francisco Moris & Nirmala Kannankutty, New Employment Statistics from the 2008
Business R&D and Innovation Survey, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. INFOBRIEF 1 (July 2010),
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf10326/nsf10326.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
26. Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show,
BLOOMBERG, (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news archive&sid=aNivT
jr852TI (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
27. INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 37.
28. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
29. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 1. As one commentator has observed, globalization has
“made Boston and Bangalore next-door neighbors.” THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL
MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE US: HOW AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND
HOW WE CAN COME BACK 62 (2011).
30. See, e.g., GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 42; accord AUGUSTINE, supra
note 12, at 67 (“The choice is straightforward: in the 21st century, a developed nation can either
innovate or evaporate.”).
31. President Obama, supra note 1.
32. Id. In the 2012 State of the Union address, President Obama similarly warned, “Don’t let
other countries win the race for the future.” President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in
State of Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.ph
p?pid=99000.
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mechanism for achieving this goal.33
Congress agreed with President Obama, and in the fall of 2011 it passed
the America Invents Act,34 which enacted the most sweeping changes to
patent law since 1952. Congressional sponsors for the Act insisted that it
would help Americans compete against foreign rivals. Senator Patrick
Leahy claimed that the Act would “give American inventors and
innovators the 21st century patent system they need to compete.”35
Representative Lamar Smith likewise stated that “[w]e need to modernize
our patent system to maintain U.S. global competitiveness and bolster the
economy.”36 Other members of Congress agreed that the reforms would
“increase our competitiveness.”37 With bipartisan support uncommon in an
era of bitter partisanship, the Act passed,38 and President Obama quickly
signed it into law.39 In a speech the same day, President Obama reiterated:
“[I]f we’re going to create jobs now and in the future, we’re going to have
to . . . out-innovate every other country on Earth.”40 President Obama
claimed that “[t]his change in our patent laws is part of our agenda for
making us competitive over the long term.”41
The appeal to U.S. politicians of using patent law to boost American
competitiveness is perhaps understandable, as invention, innovation, and
competition are closely linked. The goal of patent law is to encourage the
discovery of new inventions,42 and the conventional view is that patent law
33. NAT’L ECONOMIC COUNCIL, ET AL., supra note 2, at 2; see also INNOVATE AMERICA, supra
note 11, at 11 (arguing that the United States must “[c]reate a 21st Century Intellectual Property
Regime”).
34. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
35. Sen. Leahy, supra note 3.
36. Rep. Smith, supra note 4.
37. Press Release, Senator Al Franken, Sen. Franken: Long-Overdue Patent Reform Will
Create U.S. Jobs (Sept. 8, 2011), available at http://franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1721;
Press Release, Sen. Chris Coons, Senator Coons Praises Senate Progress in Passing Sweeping
Patent Reform Legislation (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/
release/senator-coons-praises-senate-progress-in-passing-sweeping-patent-reform-legislation.
38. See Sen. Chris Coons, supra note 37.
39. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Signs
America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and
Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act
-overhauling-patent-system-stim (noting that “the President’s Council on Jobs and
Competitiveness . . . has been a strong advocate for patent reform as a way to support job creation
and strengthen America’s competitiveness in the global economy”).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. By constitutional directive, patent law encourages invention by “securing for limited
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art I,
§ 8, cl. 8. Not all new discoveries, however, are patentable inventions. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218, 3225 (2010) (stating that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot be
patented).
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achieves this goal by providing incentives to invent in the form of
exclusive rights to an invention.43 Commercializing new inventions may
yield innovative products, services, or processes, and these innovations
may significantly affect competition.44
Surprisingly, although legal scholars recognize the potential of patent
law to affect competition, they overlook the possibility that U.S. patent
law45 might help American inventors and companies effectively compete
against foreign rivals.46 Typically, legal scholars analyze patent law from a
law-and-economics perspective under which the goal of patent law is the
general promotion of economically efficient invention, ignoring the
nationality of the inventor.47 Competitive concerns, such as which
countries’ inventors receive patents, have received almost no attention
from legal scholars.48 However, if changes to U.S. patent law affect
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
44. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259
n.4 (2007) (“We use the term innovation . . . to refer to the process of research, invention, and
development and refinement of new ideas.”); see also Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent
Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737, 1740–55 (2011) (describing effects of patent law on
innovation). Admittedly, some inventions may have little commercial value. See, e.g., U.S. Patent
No. 6,490,999 (filed Aug. 29, 2001) (describing a collar for walking a snake); U.S. Patent No.
6,293,874 (filed Jan. 4, 2000) (describing “a user-operated and controlled apparatus for selfinfliction of repetitive blows to the user’s buttocks”).
45. “Patent law” is a vague and ambiguous term. Under a broad reading, patent law includes
all laws related to patents. Under such a broad reading, patent law would include a provision of the
tax code allowing an inventor to deduct costs related to obtaining a patent. See 26 U.S.C. § 174
(2006). Under a broad reading, patent law would also include laws related to the ownership of
patents produced using funding from the Federal Government. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006).
Under a narrower interpretation, however, patent law includes only the laws related to the
availability, scope, and enforcement of exclusive rights created by patents. This Article uses this
narrower meaning of patent law.
46. Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 61, 64
(2011) (“[T]he notion that law may be a source of competitive advantage remains largely
unexplored.”).
47. Surden, supra note 44, at 1743; see, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 7–8 (2009) (examining the costs and benefits of
patents); ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 13
(5th ed. 2010) (“Patent law provides a market-drive incentive to invest in innovation, by allowing
the inventor to appropriate the full economic rewards of her invention.”); Stuart J.H. Graham et al.,
High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent
Survey, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1255, 1283 (2009) (stating that “the patent monopoly is most
commonly justified on the ground of providing incentives to innovate”); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante
Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) (“The
traditional economic justification for intellectual property is well known. Ideas are public goods:
they can be copied freely and used by anyone who is aware of them without depriving others of
their use.”); see also Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357–58, 377
(2010).
48. In the few instances in which scholars have analyzed distributive concerns, the focus is on
distributive justice. For example, scholars have examined the impact of patent law on racial
minorities, Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property
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domestic inventors more than foreign inventors, U.S. patent law may affect
the competitiveness of American firms in global markets—for better or for
worse. This Article thus begins to fill this void in the literature by
considering the relative effects of U.S. patent law incentives to invent for
domestic and foreign inventors.49
This Article makes three contributions to the scholarship regarding
patent law and global competition. First, it applies competition analysis to
patent law, highlighting the importance of competitive considerations in an
increasingly global economy. Second, this Article evaluates whether patent
law can use three mechanisms to increase U.S. incentives to invent relative
to foreign inventors: (1) protectionist patent laws, (2) patent laws that
improve the processing of patent applications by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, and (3) patent laws that support a culture in the United
States that fosters innovation. From these perspectives, this Article
assesses the capacity of the recent America Invents Act to boost U.S.
inventiveness, and concludes that the law likely will provide little
enhanced incentive for U.S. invention. Finally, by identifying limitations of
U.S. patent law in fostering domestic competitive advantage, this Article
highlights the importance of considering alternate approaches to boosting
U.S. competitiveness.
Following this Introduction, this Article proceeds in five parts. Part II
assesses the importance of relative incentives to invent. It considers
whether the United States must “out-innovate every other country on
Earth”50 in order to obtain economic prosperity, and it examines the current
invention and innovation capacity of the United States vis-à-vis other
countries. That Part concludes that relative levels of invention and
innovation between the United States and other countries are important to
U.S. economic prosperity and that the United States’ capacity to invent
likely has diminished compared to other countries. Part III analyzes
whether protectionist patent law can effectively increase domestic
incentives to invent and concludes that this approach should be avoided
because it would ultimately undermine American prosperity. Part IV
examines whether U.S. patent law can provide American inventors and
businesses with relatively enhanced incentives to invent by improving the
Policy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 416 (2008), and developing countries, Jerome H. Reichman,
Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?,
46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (2009).
49. Conversely, nonlegal commentators focusing on competition issues have occasionally
asserted that patent law is important to American economic prosperity but have not analyzed
whether U.S. patent law can help American inventors be more productive than their foreign
counterparts. See, e.g., AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 67; ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 171 (asserting
that the U.S. patent system should be reformed); KAO, supra note 12, at 232; INNOVATE AMERICA,
supra note 11, at 68–70; NAT’L ECONOMIC COUNCIL, ET AL., supra note 2, at 8; GATHERING STORM,
REVISITED, supra note 12, at 57.
50. President Obama, supra note 39.
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processing of patent applications by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
That Part concludes that typical approaches to improving patent
examination, like the America Invents Act, will have little effect on
American inventors, at least vis-à-vis foreign inventors. Part V examines
whether U.S. patent law can relatively increase U.S. incentives to invent
through a less traditional use of law: using patent law to promote social
norms and values among Americans that contribute to invention and
innovation. That Part concludes that the expressive impact of patent law
may help but the magnitude of this effect is unclear. Part VI concludes by
summarizing and by identifying additional avenues for research. In
particular, given the obstacles to using U.S. patent law to create
competitive advantage in inventing, other areas of law may be better tools
to help U.S. companies and inventors compete in a global marketplace.
I. U.S. INNOVATION AND THE U.S. ECONOMY
A. The Importance of Out-Innovating the World
Innovation is unquestionably vital to the American economy.51 The
U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that innovation produced almost
75% of the growth in the U.S. economy since World War II.52 Similarly,
economists contend that as much as 80% of growth in the gross domestic
economy stems from the introduction of new technologies.53 But is
President Obama correct that the United States must “out-innovate . . . the
rest of the world”?54
In one sense, President Obama may be overstating the importance of
superlative innovation. Countries that “out-innovate” the United States
may enjoy greater economic growth than the United States, but second-rate
economic growth may still be significant. Moreover, the United States may
gain from economic prosperity in foreign countries.55 U.S. consumers
51. In this Article, innovation is “defined broadly, to include both improvements in
technology and better methods or ways of doing things.” PORTER, supra note 12, at 45.
52. ARTI RAI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION,
PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 2 (2010). Other estimates are
lower, but still significant. See INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 36 (stating that “economists
estimate [that innovation] has accounted for half of U.S. GDP growth over the past 50 years”); see
also ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 142 (“The growth of the U.S. economy has become dependent on the
small, innovative companies that have thrived for decades in places like Silicon Valley.”).
53. KAO, supra note 12, at 21–22; see Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the
Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 320 (1957) (finding that
technological change accounted for 87.5% of increases in labor productivity between 1909 and
1949). For his work regarding innovation and economic growth, Robert Solow won the 1987 Nobel
Prize in Economics. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
1987, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/ (last
visited on Mar. 2, 2013).
54. President Obama, supra note 39.
55. See ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 155 (asserting that global economic growth will promote
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“may benefit from lower import prices and a greater variety of imports,”56
and U.S. citizens may be able to invest in foreign companies.57 “Similarly,
a prosperous world will provide more potential customers for U.S.
products and cheaper and more diverse products for U.S. consumers.”58
However, two considerations indicate that President Obama may be correct
that unsurpassed domestic innovation is important to the United States.
First, innovation affects the capacity of domestic companies59 to
compete successfully against foreign rivals.60 “Prosperity is not necessarily
a zero-sum game, but there will inevitably be winners and losers.”61 As
more markets become global, domestic businesses face greater pressure
from international competition.62 “[F]irms gain and sustain competitive
advantage in international competition through improvement, innovation,
and upgrading.”63 This process of improving goods and services is ongoing
because the advantages of today’s products are superseded by tomorrow’s
innovations.64 Recent experience in the music industry illustrates the
importance of innovation. Few people today buy vinyl records,65 and even
U.S. economic prosperity); KAO, supra note 12, at 242–43 (asserting that “what is good for the
world is good for the United States”); PORTER, supra note 12, at 30; Thomas L. Friedman, What
Goes Around…, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/26/opinion/whatgoes-around.html (“What goes around comes around, and also benefits Americans.”).
56. Mary Amiti & Kevin Stiroh, Is the United States Losing Its Productivity Advantage?, 13
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1, 1 (2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/
current_issues/ci13-8.html; see also Catherine Rampell, ‘Made in China,’ but Still Profiting
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/made-inchina-but-still-profiting-americans/ (noting that domestic businesses profit from the sale of
imports).
57. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & MANDELBAUM, supra note 29, at 28–29 (discussing American
investment in companies in India).
58. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 20.
59. Admittedly, it is difficult to clearly identify which businesses are “U.S. businesses.” See
id. at 26; Pisano & Shih, supra note 12, at 8. Some businesses may be located in the United States
but owned by foreign investors. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 26. For simplicity, “U.S. business” in
this Article refers to a business that contributes to the U.S. GDP. Foreign businesses contribute to
the American economy. Pisano & Shih, supra note 12, at 8. There may, however, be particularly
significant economic benefits to a country when a foreign business locates its headquarters in that
country. See PORTER, supra note 12, at 69–70 (“The home base is where strategy is set, core
products and process development takes place, and the essential and proprietary skills reside.”).
60. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 17, 20.
61. Id. at 20; accord GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 19.
62. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 1 (“The aviation and telecommunication revolutions
have conspired to make distance increasingly irrelevant.”).
63. PORTER, supra note 12, at 70; accord GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 43.
64. See PORTER, supra note 12, at 50–51.
65. Recently, sales of vinyl records have increased, perhaps because of their high sound
quality. Eliot Van Buskirk, Vinyl May Be Final Nail in CD’s Coffin, WIRED (Oct. 29, 2007),
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/commentary/listeningpost/2007/10/listeningpost_1029.
Nevertheless, sales of vinyl records are miniscule compared to compact discs (CDs) and internet
downloads. See 2010 Year-End Shipment Statistics, RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., http://76.74.
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CD sales are declining as online sales of music have increased.66 A music
company that fails to adjust to these technological changes cannot
compete. More generally, American companies must innovate in global
markets, or they will lose market share.67 In the face of declining market
share, those non-innovating U.S. companies will employ fewer American
workers and pay less in U.S. taxes.68
Domestic innovation also affects the global competitiveness of U.S.
workers, and “[t]he possession of quality jobs is the foundation of a high
quality life for the nation’s citizenry.”69 Unfortunately, many U.S. jobs are
in jeopardy.70 By one estimate, nearly a third of all jobs in the United
States could potentially be exported to foreign workers.71 This offshoring is
particularly likely because foreign labor, both skilled and unskilled, is often
far cheaper than American labor.72 For example, “eight engineers can be
hired in India for the cost of one in the United States. Five chemists can be
employed in China for the cost of one in the United States.”73 Advances in
24.142/548C3F4C-6B6D-F702-384C-D25E2AB93610.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
66. In 2010 alone, CD sales dropped more than 20%; in contrast, downloads of music
increased significantly. See 2010 Year-End Shipment Statistics, supra note 65.
67. Not all innovations significantly affect market share. For example, if Honda develops an
innovative new latch for a car door, Ford may not lose significant market share. Consumers may not
consider the innovation significant enough to adjust their buying habits. Similarly, other aspects of
a product, such as brand recognition, may overshadow even substantial innovations.
68. See GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 5, 17–18. Promoting innovation may
not guarantee that the United States will be a good place for all businesses. Countries that promote
innovation might be well-suited for research and development functions but not manufacturing. For
example, Apple received a great deal of attention for its innovations, but Apple employs only about
50,000 people. See Zakaria, supra note 4. In contrast, Foxconn, which produces many of Apple’s
products, employs 1,000,000 people. Id. Nevertheless, promoting innovation will help the U.S.
economy even if some aspects of a business remain tied to foreign economies. If research and
development functions are conducted in the United States, the U.S. economy will benefit more than
if those activities were located in other countries.
69. GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 2.
70. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 65–66 (explaining that American businesses can thrive
by outsourcing while U.S. workers become unemployed).
71. Alan S. Blinder, How Many US Jobs Might Be Offshorable?, 10 WORLD ECON. 41, 69
(2009) (estimating that “between 22% and 29% of all of the jobs in the 2004 US workforce” could
be “offshored”). Investing in foreign companies will not sufficiently offset domestic losses because
nearly half of all Americans do not invest in stocks. Dennis Jacobe, In U.S., 54% Have Stock
Market Investments, Lowest Since 1999, GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147
206/Stock-Market-Investments-Lowest-1999.aspx.
72. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 28–29.
73. Id. at 28. If U.S. workers are less innovative than workers in other countries, even U.S.
companies may outsource their research and development to centers in foreign countries. See id. at
63 (reporting that “only 41% of the global corporations responding to a recent survey ranked the
United States as an ‘attractive’ location for new R&D facilities, compared with 62% for China”);
KAO, supra note 12, at 39 (“More than 40 percent of our high-tech companies invest in substantial
R&D operations overseas, and at least a third of them are intent upon increasing their foreign stakes
in R&D capability.”). This approach to innovation for U.S. companies may be short-sighted,
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technology that enhance the productivity of U.S. workers may protect these
U.S. jobs from international outsourcing. Furthermore, innovation can
generate new employment opportunities in the United States because “the
creation of new, high-quality jobs is today disproportionately dependent
upon advances in science and engineering.”74
The second reason that superlative innovation is important to the U.S.
economy is that exceptional economic growth is necessary to “sustain[] the
lifestyle which has come to be enjoyed—and expected—by America’s
citizenry.”75 U.S. citizens are some of the wealthiest people on the planet.
Among developed countries, the United States has the second highest
median household income.76 To maintain these exceptional income levels,
American businesses and workers must compete effectively in global
markets, and domestic innovation is critical to that competition.77 In the
words of one commentator, “What’s at stake is nothing less than the future
prosperity and security of our nation.”78
B. Current U.S. Innovation Performance
Although measuring innovation is difficult,79 it does not appear that the
United States is “out-innovat[ing] . . . the rest of the world.”80 The
Introduction highlighted a number of troubling facts regarding U.S.
innovation. Other measures also indicate problems. For example, economic
analysts have compiled global innovation rankings that rely on multiple
factors related to innovation, and the rankings of the United States in these
studies are disquieting.81 The Information Technology and Innovation
however, because innovation “thrives in face-to-face interactions and in fruitful collaborations
among engineering, marketing, and management.” ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 138; accord KAO, supra
note 12, at 40–41. Businesses likewise benefit when their research and development sectors are
close to their marketing and manufacturing centers. See PORTER, supra note 12, at 93.
74. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 15; accord GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at
18.
75. GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 41.
76. OECD, SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2011: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS 43 (2011).
77. See Pisano & Shih, supra note 12, at 2; Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic
Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1661, 1698 (1990) (noting that “the ‘required’
number of inventions for a steady positive rate of growth in productivity has also to grow”).
78. KAO, supra note 12, at 3.
79. See Michael E. Porter & Scott Stern, Innovation: Location Matters, 42 MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 28, 31 (2001) (“Of course, no single measure of innovation is ideal.”).
80. President Obama, supra note 1.
81. See ROBERT D. ATKINSON & SCOTT M. ANDES, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.,
THE ATLANTIC CENTURY II: BENCHMARKING EU & U.S. INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS, 20–23
(2011), available at http://www.itif.org/files/2011-atlantic-century.pdf; EUROPEAN BUSINESS
SCHOOL, THE INNOVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010–2011: INNOVATION AS A DRIVER OF
PRODUCTIVITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH x–xi (Augusto López-Claros ed., 2011), available at http:/
/www.innovationfordevelopmentreport.org/papers/ICIrankings2010_11.pdf; JAMES P. ANDREW ET
AL., INNOVATION 2010: A RETURN TO PROMINENCE—AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss2/1

12

Hubbard: Competitive Patent Law

2013]

COMPETITIVE PATENT LAW

353

Foundation recently released a study comparing the innovative capacity of
forty different countries.82 The study considered sixteen factors to measure
innovation capacity in each country, including the number of science and
technology researchers; the amount of capital invested in research; the
number of scholarly publications; the availability of technological
infrastructure such as high-speed Internet; tax rates; gross domestic product
per working-age adult; and worker productivity.83 The study concluded
that the United States ranked fourth, behind Singapore, Finland, and
Sweden.84 Most alarming, however, was the study’s consideration of
investment in innovation in the past twelve years. In that comparison, the
United States ranked an abysmal thirty-ninth in research and forty-third
overall.85 Another multifactor analysis of innovation ranked the United
States fifth in the world in 2011.86 Similarly, in a 2010 Boston Consulting
Group report identifying new, innovative companies, six out of seven
companies were from outside the United States.87 Likewise, a report by the
Economist evaluated the capacity of different countries to capitalize on
information technologies and ranked the United States third.88
Patents provide another gauge of the innovation output of different
countries. A patent gives a person the exclusive right to use a new
technology in the country that issued the patent. For example, a U.S. patent
gives its owner the exclusive right to make, use, sell, and offer for sale an
invention in the United States.89 These rights encourage an inventor to
invest time and resources in developing new technology by allowing the
inventor to obtain supracompetitive profits during the period of
exclusivity.90 Because of the value of patents, important innovations are
17 (2010), available at http://tobiaslist.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/innovation-2010-bcg.pdf; see
also ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DIGITAL ECONOMY RANKINGS 2010: BEYOND E-READINESS 3–4
(2010), available at http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/gbs/bus/pdf/eiu_digital-economyrankings-2010_final_web.pdf (ranking the countries' digital development).
82. See ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 81, at 9.
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id. at 9.
85. See id. at 11.
86. See EUROPEAN BUSINESS SCHOOL, supra note 81, at x–xi.
87. See ANDREW ET AL., supra note 81, at 17. Three companies are from China, one is from
Japan, one is from Taiwan, and one is from Brazil. Id.
88. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 81, at 2, 4. Some other studies evaluating U.S.
innovation are more optimistic. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT
2010–2011 340 (Klaus Schwab ed., 2010) (ranking the United States first in “innovation” but
fourth in overall “competitiveness”); INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 36 (“America today is a
clear No. 1 in productive innovation.”).
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
90. See id. U.S. patents are particularly valuable because the United States economy is the
largest market in the world according to GDP. See The World Factbook, Field Listing: GDP
(Official Exchange Rate), CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
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frequently patented.91 Moreover, in many countries, patents provide data
regarding the nationality of the inventor who obtained the patent. As a
result, patent activity can serve as a proxy for the innovation output of
different countries.92 Americans are not leading the world in patenting. For
example, in 2011, Japanese inventors received 304,604 patents in various
patent offices around the world.93 In contrast, American inventors received
only 201,158 patents.94 This trend likely will continue, as Japanese
inventors are also filing more patent applications than American inventors,
although the gap may be narrowing: In 2011, Japanese inventors outpaced
their American counterparts by more than 40,000 patent applications.95
U.S. inventors are even struggling to maintain dominance in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office. Since 2008, foreign inventors have received
more than 50% of the patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office.96 In 1963, foreign inventors accounted for just 18.6% of U.S.
91. Indeed, patent numbers closely correlate with other measures of innovation. See Griliches,
supra note 77, at 1673 (noting the “strong relationship between R&D and the number of patents
received”); Porter & Stern, supra note 79, at 30.
92. Importantly, however, patents are only a proxy for innovation, and not a precise measure.
First, some companies do not consider patents to be important for competition. See Graham et al.,
supra note 47, 1290 fig. 1. Other forms of intellectual property, such as trade secrets, may protect
inventions. Id. Second, even when inventions are patented, they may not be commercialized.
Sichelman, supra note 47, at 343–44; see also Elizabeth Webster & Paul H. Jensen, Do Patents
Matter for Commercialization?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 431, 431 (2011) (finding that “a patent grant had
no effect on the decision to proceed with the commercialization process”); supra notes 42–44 and
accompanying text. Indeed, some patents are invalid because they do not describe sufficiently new
technology. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242–43 (2011). Some patents
thus do not reflect innovation. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 44, at 259 n.4 (distinguishing
between “invention” and “innovation”). Finally, even among patents that are commercialized, the
number of patents that different industries obtain often varies. Other things being equal, inventors in
patent-intensive industries will obtain more patents than inventors in other industries. As a result,
differences in patent quantities between inventors from different countries may stem from one
country’s economy involving more patent-intensive industries, rather than a difference in the
capacity of the inventors from the countries to develop new, commercially significant ideas. Despite
these concerns, patent counts can serve as a meaningful proxy for the number of inventions a
country produces. See Griliches, supra note 77, at 1673, 1702 (arguing that “patents may indeed be
a good indicator of unobserved inventive output”); Porter & Stern, supra note 79, at 31 (measuring
innovative output by the number of patents granted).
93. Appendix A infra (tabulating patent and patent application data from the World
Intellectual Property Organization).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2011,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (May 22, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf. When a patent issues to multiple inventors, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office only reports the nationality of the first inventor listed on the patent. Patent Tech.
Monitoring Team, Patents By Country, State, and Year—Utility Patents (December 2011), U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/
cst_utl.htm. On patents with both a foreign and a U.S. inventor, there is no reason to expect that the
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patents.97 Matters are worse when adjusted for population. The United
States is the third most populous country in the world.98 If innovation is to
drive economic prosperity in the United States, then the United States
likely will need more innovations than a less populous country.99 Among
major patenting countries in 2011, the United States ranked ninth in
patents per capita.100 Per capita, Japanese inventors received more than
three times as many patents as U.S. inventors in 2011.101
Thus, by many measures, the United States trails other countries in
innovating.102 Indeed, many commentators argue that the United States is
beginning to suffer from an “innovation gap.”103 In the words of one
commentator, “America’s economy is in danger of losing what has always
been our greatest competitive advantage: our genius for innovation.”104
The remainder of this Article addresses whether U.S. patent law can help
U.S. inventors close this gap by providing U.S. entities with enhanced
incentives to invent vis-à-vis the incentives for foreign inventors.

foreign inventor will be listed first more frequently than the U.S. inventor. As a result, if the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office were to track the nationalities of all inventors, the ratio of foreign to
domestic inventors would probably remain unchanged. See also infra note 340 (discussing similar
issues for patent statistics reported by the World Intellectual Property Organization).
97. Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2011, supra
note 96.
98. Population 2011, World Development Indicators Database, THE WORLD BANK, available
at http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/POP.pdf.
99. GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 46 (arguing that “the size of the
economy to be maintained affects the size of the effort needed for its maintenance”). Per capita
patent figures favor countries in which much of the industry is focused on technologically
sophisticated industries. For example, if every employable citizen in a country were in a
technologically sophisticated industry, the citizenry of such a country would produce more patents
on a per capita basis than a country where only a handful of people are focused on developing new
technology.
100. See Appendix A infra (calculating patents per capita and patent applications per capita
using figures from the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Bank). Similarly, for
per capita patent application in 2011, the United States ranked tenth. Id.
101. Id.
102. INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 37 (noting that “we now face much more serious
competitive challenges from new centers of innovation across an increasingly interconnected
planet”).
103. E.g., ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 4–5 (arguing that America “has lost the core values that
were the catalysts of its [innovation] success”); KAO, supra note 12, at 2 (asserting that America’s
“capacity for innovation is eroding”); INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 38; Lechleiter, supra
note 4 (stating that “America’s economy is in danger of losing what has always been our greatest
competitive advantage: our genius for innovation”); see also AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 4
(stating that “America is rapidly losing its competitive position”).
104. Lechleiter, supra note 4; accord Daniel McGinn, The Decline of Western Innovation:
Why America Is Falling Behind and How to Fix It, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 2009, at 34 (stating that in
a 2009 survey, only 41% of Americans stated that the United States “is staying ahead of China on
innovation”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

356

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

II. PROTECTIONISM AND U.S. PATENT LAW
One potential mechanism for using U.S. patent law to give American
companies and American inventors relatively enhanced incentives to
invent would be for U.S. patent law explicitly to favor American interests
in awarding and enforcing patents. For example, federal law could require
that the U.S. Patent Office prioritize the review of applications from
American inventors, apply more lenient standards when examining patent
applications filed by American citizens, or charge different application fees
depending on inventor nationality. U.S. patent law could also be facially
neutral but still discriminate against foreign inventors. For instance, U.S.
patent law could deny patent protection for inventions that lacked domestic
manufacturing in the United States. These types of protectionist patent
laws might help domestic innovators obtain patents and thus might
increase the returns on investments in innovation in the United States.
This Part examines the capacity of U.S. patent law to implement a
protectionist agenda, and begins by examining the extent to which U.S.
patent law historically has embraced protectionism. Next, this Part
examines the extent to which international treaties prevent the United
States from enacting protectionist patent law and determines that the
United States would risk international sanctions if it were to return to its
protectionist past. Finally, in light of these risks, this Part considers
whether implementing protectionist patent law would make domestic firms
more innovative than their foreign rivals.
A. Protectionist Roots in U.S. Patent Law
In the past, U.S. patent law was often explicitly protectionist. For
example, under the Patent Act of 1793, U.S. patents could only issue to “a
citizen or citizens of the United States.”105 In 1800, Congress amended the
Patent Act to extend patent eligibility to foreign inventors, but only if those
inventors resided in America for two years and took an oath of their
intention to become United States citizens.106 For more than forty years,
the United States offered no patent protection to the discoveries of
nonresident foreign inventors, so that “foreign inventions could be
introduced to America without the additional cost of the inventor’s
monopoly rights.”107 In 1836, Congress amended the Patent Act to allow
nonresident foreign inventors to obtain U.S. patents,108 but simultaneously
introduced a protectionist scheme of patent application fees. The fee
105. Patent Act of 1793 § 1, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–19.
106. S. REP. NO. 24-239 (1836), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/
Senate_Report_for_Bill_No_293.pdf.
107. Susan Sell, Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective:
Contestation and Settlement, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 267, 286 (2004) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
108. Patent Act of 1836 § 8, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 120.
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schedule required that a U.S. citizen pay $30 to file a patent application, a
“subject of the King of Great Britain” pay $500, and any other nonresident
noncitizen pay $300 to file an application for a U.S. patent.109 Protectionist
application fees remained in place until 1870, when Congress established
uniform fees for all patent applicants regardless of nationality or
residency.110
Even after the elimination of discriminatory fees, U.S. patent law
retained protectionist elements, particularly in addressing concurrent
invention by American and foreign inventors. For instance, the Patent Act
of 1870 established a “caveat” system that, until 1903, was only available
to U.S. citizens and foreign inventors who “resided in the United States
one year next preceding the filing of [their] caveat[s], and made oath[s] of
[their] intention[s] to become . . . citizen[s].”111 Under this system, an
inventor could file with the Patent Office an abbreviated patent application
called a “caveat” that would serve as a placeholder for a normal patent
application. If another inventor later filed an application on the same
invention, the first inventor could file a patent application, which the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office would treat as if it were filed on the date the
inventor filed the caveat.112 The caveat thus preserved an inventor’s
chronological priority while giving the inventor an opportunity to allow the
“invention or discovery . . . to mature” into a commercially successful
endeavor.113 If an invention did not prove commercially viable, an inventor
who filed a caveat would have avoided the greater expense of filing a
complete patent application.114
Significant protectionist features of U.S. patent law existed as recently
as 1994.115 Prior to that time, U.S. patent law favored American inventors
over nonresident foreign inventors regarding the establishment of
“invention dates.” For more than a century, certain issues in U.S. patent
law depended on the date an invention was discovered. For example, an
inventor could not obtain a patent if “the invention was . . . described in a
printed publication . . . before the invention thereof [that is, before the
109. Patent Act of 1836 § 9, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 121 (stating that a foreign inventor could
avoid these heightened fees if he “ha[d] been resident in the United States for one
year . . . and . . . made oath of his intention to become a citizen thereof”).
110. Patent Act of 1870 §§ 24–25 & 68, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 201, 209; see also Nuno Pires
de Carvalho, The Primary Function of Patents, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 25, 43 n.90 (2001).
111. Patent Act of 1870 at § 40, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 204; The Patent Act of 1903 § 4, ch.
1019, 32 Stat. 1225, 1227 (extending the caveat system to foreign, nonresident inventors).
112. Patent Act of 1870 § 40, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 203 (stating that by statute, a caveat would
only protect an inventor for one year).
113. Id.
114. Patent Act of 1870 §§ 40, 68, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 203, 209 (showing that caveat
applications were shorter than patent applications and also involved smaller fees).
115. See K. William Watson, Still a Protectionist Trade Remedy: The Case for Repealing
Section 337, Policy Analysis no. 708, Cato Institute, Sept. 19, 2012, at 1, 5.
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invention date].”116 Similarly, when two people discovered the same
invention and both applied for patents, U.S. patent law awarded a patent
only to the person with the earlier invention date, even if the first person to
invent was the second person to apply for a patent.117 In determining dates
of invention, U.S. patent law disfavored foreign inventors in that “an
applicant for a patent . . . may not establish a date of invention by reference
to . . . activity with respect thereto, in a foreign country.”118
As a result, foreign, nonresident inventors usually could not establish
invention dates that were earlier than the dates they filed U.S. patent
applications because they performed the activities relevant to establishing
the invention date in foreign jurisdictions.119 In contrast, most American
inventors performed these activities within the United States. Because of
this protectionist difference, a foreign inventor could fail to obtain a U.S.
patent even if the foreign inventor discovered an invention before its
American counterpart.120 The protectionist restrictions of this aspect of
U.S. patent law significantly diminished over time. For example, in 1994,
Congress amended the Patent Act so that inventive activity in foreign
countries that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) could
be used to establish invention dates under U.S. patent law.121 For nonWTO countries,122 this protectionist provision of U.S. patent law was not
eliminated until 2011.123

116. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); see also Patent Act of 1870 § 24, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 201
(preventing a person from obtaining a patent on an invention that had been “described in any
printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his invention or discovery thereof”).
117. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 625–26 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing
invention dates). When determining which inventor was first, U.S. patent law defined the date of
invention as the date that an idea was initially conceived, provided that the first person to conceive
of an invention was diligent in reducing that conception to practice. See infra note 182 and
accompanying text.
118. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 104, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 798.
119. See, e.g., Rousseau v. Brown, 21 App. D.C. 73, 79 (1903).
120. See id.
121. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. 5, 108 Stat. 4809, 4973–89
(1994) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2006)).
122. At present, there are 157 countries that are members of the WTO. See Understanding the
WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
123. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(d), (n), 125 Stat. 287, 293 (2011). Some other provisions of U.S.
law that are related to patent law arguably are still protectionist. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 204
(2006) states that a small business or nonprofit organization that receives a patent for an invention
discovered using federal funds shall not grant an exclusive license to use an invention in the United
States unless the licensee “agrees that any products embodying the subject invention or produced
through the use of the subject invention will be manufactured substantially in the United States.” As
noted, this is not the type of law included in the term “patent law” for this Article. See supra note
45.
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B. The Legality of Protectionist U.S. Patent Law
U.S. patent law could favor U.S. interests by resurrecting the
protectionism historically embraced by U.S. patent law. For example, the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office could examine patent applications filed
by American inventors before applications filed by foreign inventors.124
Similarly, Congress could require that foreign inventors pay larger filing
fees.
Such protectionist actions, however, would violate the terms of
international treaties that the United States has joined. For example, in
1887, the United States signed the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (Paris Convention).125 Article 2 of this treaty provides:
The subjects or citizens of each of the contracting States shall enjoy, in
all the other States of the Union, so far as concerns patents for
inventions, trade or commercial marks, and the commercial name, the
advantages that the respective laws thereof at present accord, or shall
afterwards accord to subjects or citizens. In consequence they shall
have the same protection as these latter, and the same legal recourse
against all infringements of their rights, under reserve of complying
with the formalities and conditions imposed upon subjects or citizens
by the domestic legislation of each State.126
Similarly, in 1994, the United States signed the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).127 Article 3 of
TRIPs states that “[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals of other
124. Indeed, as recently as June 2010, the U.S. Patent Office proposed delaying the
examination of many applications submitted by foreign inventors. Enhanced Examination Timing
Control Initiative, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,764 (June 4, 2010). Specifically, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office proposed regulations that would accelerate the examination of some patent applications
while delaying the examination of others. Id. As part of a scheme, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office recommended delaying the examination of any U.S. patent application that relied on a
foreign patent application for a filing date. Id. At present, however, this part of the proposal has not
been implemented. See Changes to Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track I) of the
Enhanced Examination Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,399 (Apr. 4, 2011) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (implementing part of the proposed changes but not the portion dealing
with U.S. applications based on foreign patent applications). The Korean Intellectual Property
Office objected to the proposed delay. Letter from Jeong-yeol Park, Director General, Electronic
and Electric Examination Bureau, Korean Intellectual Property Office, to Robert L. Stoll,
Commissioner for Patents, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Aug. 20, 2010),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/3track_kipo_20aug2010.pdf.
125. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372.
126. Id. at art. 2. The Paris Convention also prohibits some laws that are facially neutral but
have differential impact on foreign inventors. For example, the Paris Convention states that “no
requirement as to domicile . . . may be imposed.” Id.
127. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C to the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 [hereinafter “TRIPs Agreement”].
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Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords its own nationals
with regard to the protection of intellectual property.”128 Furthermore,
under Article 27 of TRIPs, patent rights must be available “without
discrimination as to the place of invention, . . . and whether products are
imported or locally produced.”129
Although these treaties appear to prohibit protectionist U.S. patent law,
their effect is limited in two ways. First, Congress can repudiate these
treaties by passing a contrary statute, like a protectionist provision of patent
law. The U.S. Constitution declares that “all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.”130 However, “Congress has the power, accepted since at
least 1798, to terminate, or repudiate, treaty obligations altogether.”131 As
an administrative agency, the power of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office to repudiate a treaty may be more limited than Congress’s. The U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office may nevertheless be able to embrace
protectionism because of the second limit on the scope of these two
treaties: They cannot be applied in U.S. courts. Treaties can only be
judicially enforced if they are “self-executing,” in which case courts apply
such treaties like federal statutes.132 If a treaty is held to be “non-selfexecuting,” supporting federal legislation is required to give legal effect to
the treaty’s provisions.133 Significantly, courts have generally held that the
Paris Convention and TRIPs are not self-executing.134 As a result, if the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office were to implement a protectionist
agenda, foreign inventors and businesses could not bring challenges in U.S.
courts.135
128. Id. at art. 3(1). “Protection” in this provision “shall include matters affecting the
availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property rights.” Id. at
art. 3 n.3. The antiprotectionist provisions of TRIPs and the Paris Convention overlap. John F.
Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 685, 703 (2002).
129. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 127, at art. 27(1).
130. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
131. Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 587 (2007).
132. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161 n.21 (2d Cir. 2007); Wu, supra note 131,
at 578.
133. Wu, supra note 131, at 579–80. Determining whether a treaty is self-executing is a
complicated analysis involving many factors. Id.
134. ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 161 (holding that TRIPs is not self-executing); In re Rath, 402 F.3d
1207, 1210–11 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Int’l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café Int’l, Inc., 252 F.3d
1274, 1277 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Paris Convention is not self-executing); Caveats
for Patents for Inventions, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 273, 275–76 (1889) (holding that there are classes of
treaties that are not self-executing). But see Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640
(2d Cir.1956) (stating in dicta that the Paris Convention is self-executing).
135. For example, in 1889 a Swiss inventor challenged under the Paris Convention the
provision of U.S. patent law barring nonresident foreign inventors from filing caveats. Caveats for
Patents for Inventions, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 273, 274–75 (1889). In a published opinion, the U.S.
Attorney General agreed that the Paris Convention conflicted with U.S. patent law but nevertheless
held that the Paris Convention “requires legislation to render it effective for the modification of
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Although these treaties provide little obstacle to protectionism under
federal law, they may nonetheless be enforced through international
enforcement mechanisms. The Paris Convention provides that “[a]ny
dispute between two or more countries . . . concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention, not settled by negotiation, may, by any one
of the countries concerned, be brought before the International Court of
Justice.”136 Under TRIPs, a foreign country could initiate enforcement
proceedings in the World Trade Organization.137 In fact, the United States
has initiated numerous dispute resolution proceedings under TRIPs.138 In
some instances, the United States has used WTO enforcement mechanisms
to attack protectionist patent laws of other countries.139 Similarly, another
country could use the enforcement mechanisms of the WTO and TRIPs to
oppose protectionist patent law in the United States, and a successful
challenge to protectionist U.S. patent law would entitle the prevailing
country to enact retaliatory measures.140
C. Policy Concerns with Protectionism
Although the United States might incur international sanctions for
returning U.S. patent law to its protectionist roots, the United States has the
ability to do so. If the domestic benefits of protectionism outweigh the
costs, protectionist patent law might increase American prosperity.
existing [U.S. patent] laws.” Id. at 279.
136. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 28(1), Sept. 28, 1979 (as
amended).
137. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 127, at art. 64; see also Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 23, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement] (describing WTO dispute resolution
proceedings). Because TRIPs incorporates the antiprotectionist provisions of the Paris Convention,
an aggrieved country could also invoke WTO dispute resolution mechanisms to address a violation
of Article 2 of the Paris Convention. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 127, art. 2(1).
138. See Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A26#selected_
agreement (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
139. For example, in May 2000, the United States initiated proceedings against Brazil because
Brazil’s patent laws stated that a patent was subject to compulsory licensing if the subject matter of
the patent was not manufactured in Brazil. Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—
Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000). Although facially neutral, such
a provision favors Brazilian industries because they are naturally more likely to manufacture
products in Brazil. The United States argued that this provision of Brazilian patent law violated the
prohibition in TRIPs of “discrimination regarding the availability of patents and the enjoyment of
patent rights on the basis of whether products are imported or locally produced.” Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection,
WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001). After the WTO constituted a panel to resolve the issue, the United
States and Brazil settled. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001).
140. Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 137, at art. 23.
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However, protectionism likely would not increase American innovation.
In general, governments eschew protectionism because it is
economically inefficient.141 For example, if tariffs on imported goods
prevent foreign businesses from selling equivalent products at lower prices
than domestic rivals, then those tariffs actually create economic losses.142
Protectionism nevertheless might be defended on the theory that, even if it
reduces global economic prosperity, it increases domestic prosperity
because it protects domestic manufacturers.143 For example, if Chinese
companies can more cheaply manufacture computers than U.S. businesses,
U.S. tariffs on Chinese computers might help some domestic
manufacturers, at least in the short term.144 However, for almost two
hundred years, economists have argued that protectionism reduces
domestic prosperity.145 In general, protectionist tariffs on imports raise
prices and thus create deadweight losses, in part because some domestic
consumers cannot afford to pay the higher prices.146 Protectionism also
reduces domestic prosperity by insulating domestic businesses from the
competitive pressures that lead to the development of superior products
and services.147 As John Stuart Mill argued in 1848, protectionist tariffs
“render the labour and capital of the country less efficient in production
than they would otherwise be.”148
For these same reasons, even if protectionist patent law might increase
the incentives for American inventors to discover new ideas, it likely
would undermine American innovation. For example, if protectionist
patent law increased the price of inventions in the United States, some U.S.
consumers and U.S. businesses would be unable to afford these increased
prices. Protectionist patent laws would also shield American inventors
from competitive pressures that spur innovation, and American inventors
141. Duffy, supra note 128, at 702; John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 521 (2000).
142. NIGEL GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS 22–24
(1996).
143. Certainly, politicians who promote protectionism often claim to be helping domestic
industries.
144. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 141, at 522 (noting that “free trade does not
make everyone within a nation better off, at least in the short term”). See generally DOUGLAS A.
IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE 92 (1996).
145. IRWIN, supra note 144, at 93 (“All the leading economists of the first half of the
nineteenth century—James Mill, David Ricardo, Robert Torrens, John Stuart Mill, John Ramsay
McCulloch, Nassau Senior, to mention but the most eminent—wrote . . . in favor of free trade and
stood in virtual unanimity against protectionist import duties.”).
146. GRIMWADE, supra note 142, at 24. Protectionism regarding innovation may increase
domestic welfare if domestic innovation “has important spillover effects on other sectors of the
economy.” Id. at 32. Even in this situation, however, a direct subsidy of domestic innovation would
be better than protectionist patent law. Id.
147. PORTER, supra note 12, at 30.
148. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 917 (1909).
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might actually become less innovative.149 Finally, protectionist U.S. patent
law might also undermine domestic prosperity by prompting other
countries to enact their own protectionist measures.150 Indeed, as described
above, protectionist U.S. patent law would violate TRIPs, and the WTO’s
dispute resolution procedures encourage aggrieved countries to address
violations through action in “the same sector(s) as that in which . . . [there
has been] a violation.”151
III. TYPICAL APPROACHES TO IMPROVING U.S. PATENT OFFICE
PROCEDURES
Protectionism is not the only way that law can help American
companies and inventors compete against foreign rivals. Protectionism
shields domestic businesses from competitive forces in the naïve hope of
increasing domestic prosperity. Sometimes, however, domestic entities
outperform their foreign rivals simply because they are better able to
compete in global markets. Such innovators have a “competitive
advantage” over their rivals.152 More specifically, a competitive advantage
is “a value-creating strategy using firm resources to improve a firm’s
efficiency or effectiveness in ways not in use by current or potential
competitors.”153
Many factors contribute to competitive advantage, including law.154 For
example, federal law governs the use of the airwaves for radio
transmissions throughout the United States.155 If the federal government
were to make more bandwidth available for commercial use, innovators
149. PORTER, supra note 12, at 30.
150. Of course, the extent to which foreign governments and researchers retaliate against U.S.
inventors depends upon the nature of U.S. protectionist measures. Some protectionist measures may
be less inflammatory than others.
151. Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 137, at art. 22. Protectionist U.S.
patent law thus may undermine the efforts of U.S. inventors to obtain foreign patents. Importantly,
foreign patents provide U.S. inventors with significant returns: from 1995 to 2009, U.S. inventors
obtained approximately 41% of their patents in foreign jurisdictions. See Econ. and Statistics Div.,
Patent Grants by Country of Origin and Patent Office (1995-2010), WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP.
ORG., (Dec., 2011), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/xls/wipo_
pat_grant_by_origin_office_table.xls.
152. See generally PORTER, supra note 12, at 129–30 (describing competitive advantage in
global markets).
153. Bird, supra note 46, at 71.
154. See PORTER, supra note 12, at 70 (noting that certain conditions encourage “firms [to]
improve and innovate and continue to do so faster and in the proper directions compared to their
international rivals”). See generally MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 326–30 (1996) (discussing ways to increase “the
proportion of people showing the traits of creativity”); Bird, supra note 46, at 71–76, 78–80
(modeling the determinates of competitive advantage in global markets).
155. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (empowering the Federal Communications Commission to
regulate “communication by wire and radio”).
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located in the United States might be better able to develop new wireless
technologies than foreign counterparts operating in countries where less
bandwidth is available for innovation.156 A change in the regulation of the
airwaves therefore might encourage domestic competitive advantage
without protectionist side effects.157 Importantly, unlike protectionism,
laws that create competitive advantage for domestic businesses do not
reduce domestic or global prosperity.158 Instead, laws that promote U.S.
competitive advantage increase global welfare and simultaneously enable
the United States to capture a greater share of global markets.159
As described above, patent law is closely related to competition.160
Valuable patent rights encourage firms and individuals to discover new
inventions, and new ideas are central to success in international
competition.161 This Part assesses whether U.S. patent laws can provide
American entities with competitive advantages by creating relatively
enhanced incentives for these entities to invent.
A. Examples
In the past, some simple aspects of U.S. patent law have provided
American companies and inventors with enhanced incentives to invent
without being protectionist. One example is the use of the English
language by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. American inventors are
more likely to speak English than foreign inventors, who may face
significant translation costs both in understanding U.S. patent laws and in
drafting U.S. patent applications.162 Cheaper access to U.S. patents likely
156. Indeed, the Federal Communications Commission recently required changes to television
broadcasts in part to “allow[] some of the spectrum to be auctioned to companies that will be able to
provide consumers with more advanced wireless services (such as wireless broadband).” Learn
About DTV: Frequently Asked Questions, DTV.GOV, http://www.dtv.gov/consumercorner.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2013). But see PORTER, supra note 12, at 82–83 (discussing the impact of
overcoming shortcomings on innovation).
157. Law can also create competitive disadvantages through restrictive regulations. For
example, the German chemical company BASF recently announced plans to move a major research
facility focusing on genetically modified organisms from Germany to the United States because
“there is still a lack of acceptance for this technology in many parts of Europe—from the majority
of consumers, farmers and politicians.” BASF to Concentrate Plant Biotechnology Activities on
Main Markets in North and South America, BASF (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.basf.com/group/
pressrelease/P-12-109.
158. See PORTER, supra note 12, at 631 (discussing how policy that promotes innovation must
also encompass competition, and how technological progress that addresses these concerns not only
helps the technology industry, but the entire national industry as well).
159. Within some industries, the competitive advantages of foreign rivals may stem from
economic conditions that are unique to that country that the United States cannot emulate. PORTER,
supra note 12, at 194–95.
160. See supra notes 42–49, 59–69 and accompanying text.
161. Id.
162. Patent applications may be filed “in a language other than English.” Patents, Trademarks,
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provides American inventors with a small competitive advantage because
U.S. patents—and only U.S. patents—provide exclusive rights to make,
use, or sell an invention throughout the United States, which is the largest
market in the world.163
Similarly, in the past the existence and strength of U.S. patent law may
have provided American inventors with a domestic competitive advantage
because strong patent laws favor innovators over imitators, and American
companies historically have been world-leading innovators.164 Without
patent law, American businesses might not have been able to recover the
investments required to develop new technologies.165 Foreign competitors
could have copied American innovations and undercut American
inventors’ prices because the foreign copies would not have needed to
include development costs in their pricing.166 Based on such fears, the
United States was a major proponent of international treaties, particularly
TRIPs, that required all signatories to enact laws providing for robust
patent rights.167 Countries whose citizens produce fewer inventions may
benefit from weaker patent protection.168
Today, these two sources of competitive advantage likely are eroding.
The use of English in U.S. patent law may not provide significant
competitive advantage in the near future because citizens of many

and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(d) (2011). Before a patent can be examined by the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, however, a patent applicant must provide an English language translation of
the application, a statement that the translation is accurate, and an additional processing fee. Id.
163. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 61. A foreign inventor may face lower costs in obtaining a
foreign patent, but that patent is less valuable because it applies to a smaller market. Recent patent
activities in Europe demonstrate the potential impact of foreign languages on competitive
advantage. Europe lacks a unified patent system, despite widespread agreement that such a system
would benefit Europe. See Joe Kirwin, Much Celebrated Breakthrough on EU’s Patent System
Proves to Be a Bit Premature, 84 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 401 (2012). For years,
disagreements among European countries regarding the official languages to be used in a unified
patent system have blocked unification efforts. Id. Recently, the European Commission proposed a
unified patent system using only English, French, and German as languages, prompting Spain and
Italy to object. Id.
164. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 695–96 (noting that countries with many innovators favor
patent protection, while countries with many copyists do not). For a long time, U.S. inventors
apparently obtained more patents than inventors from any other country in the world. Econ. &
Statistics Div., Total Number of Patent Grants (1985–2009) by Resident and Non-Resident, WORLD
INTELLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/ (follow “Total number
of patent grants (1985–2009) by resident and non-resident” hyperlink to XLS or CSV file) (last
visited Mar. 2, 2013) (reporting patent grants by patent office, broken down by resident and
nonresident from 1883–2009).
165. See William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 374–75 (2011)
(discussing how inventors monetize their inventions).
166. MERGES ET AL., supra note 47, at 12.
167. Duffy, supra note 128, at 688, 695.
168. Id. at 695–96.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

366

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

countries around the world are learning English.169 By one estimate,
“China graduates more English-speaking engineers than the United
States.”170 Moreover, the magnitude of any “English advantage” may be
decreasing because U.S. patents soon may not be the most valuable type of
patents in the world: “Between 2012 and 2020, China will pass the United
States to become the largest consumer market in the world.”171 As a result,
cheap access to Chinese patents may become as important as cheap access
to U.S. patents. Similarly, strong U.S. patent law by itself may be
insufficient to provide domestic competitive advantage because foreign
inventors obtain many U.S. patents.172 In fact, in some technological areas,
foreign inventors obtain more U.S. patents than U.S. inventors.173
B. Improving the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Traditionally, patent scholars and policymakers attempt to improve the
workings of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by reducing (1) the cost
and duration of the examination of patent applications and (2) the number
of invalid patents174 issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.175
Indeed, President Obama and the congressional supporters of the America
Invents Act contend that the Act achieves all of the traditional types of
improvements to the processes of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
and that these improvements will increase American competitiveness in
global markets.176 This Section reviews the alleged improvements to the
procedures of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and analyzes whether
these traditional types of improvements will provide American entities
with enhanced incentives to invent vis-à-vis foreign inventors.177
169. By some accounts, the number of English speakers in China will soon exceed the number
of English speakers in the United States. John Gregg, Jon Huntsman says more English speakers in
China than United States, POLITIFACT.COM (Aug. 19, 2011, 4:46 PM), http://www.politifact.com/tr
uth-o-meter/statements/2011/aug/19/jon-huntsman/jon-huntsman-says-more-english-speakerschina-unit/.
170. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 44.
171. Id. at 61.
172. See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
173. See infra note 219 (discussing technological areas in which foreign inventors obtain more
U.S. patents than U.S. inventors). But see infra notes 209–12.
174. A U.S. patent can be invalid for many reasons. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03, 112.
175. For a sample of typical approaches to improving the processing of patent applications by
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, see generally supra note 47 and accompanying text.
176. Sen. Chris Coons, supra note 37; Sen. Franken: Long-Overdue Patent Reform Will
Create U.S. Jobs, supra note 37; Sen. Patrick Leahy, Comment of Senator Leahy on the Senate
Motion to Proceed to the America Invents Act, supra note 3; President Obama, supra note 39; Rep.
Smith, supra note 4; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., RISING ABOVE THE
GATHERING STORM: ENERGIZING AND EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER ECONOMIC FUTURE
187–88 (2007) (arguing that the United States should shift to a first-to-file system to “increase the
efficiency and predictability of the US system”).
177. The Act contains other provisions that may improve the speed and quality of patent
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1. Improvements in the America Invents Act
The America Invents Act contains numerous, significant changes to
U.S. patent law that are designed to reduce the cost and delay of obtaining
a U.S. patent.178 For example, in previous years, some of the fees that the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office collected were used to support other
parts of the Federal Government. The Act ensures that the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office will retain more of its fees.179 With more money, the
Patent and Trademark Office can hire more patent examiners and purchase
better equipment, thereby decreasing the time required to examine patent
applications. The Act also reduces the cost of filing patent applications for
certain inventors working for small businesses.180
Perhaps the largest, potentially cost-saving, reform in the Act is the
change from a “first-to-invent” system to a “first-to-file” system.181 Under
the older first-to-invent system, important aspects of patent law depended
upon the “invention date” for a discovery, which was defined as the date an
inventor conceived of an idea, provided that the inventor was sufficiently
diligent in reducing that conception to practice.182 For example, an inventor
could not obtain a patent for a discovery that was “known or used by others
in this country . . . before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent.”183 Similarly, when two separate inventors sought to obtain patents
on the same discovery, the inventor with the earlier invention date would
receive the patent.184 In contrast, for both of these issues, a first-to-file
system uses the dates that inventors actually file patent applications, not
the invention dates.185 Because an inventor conceives of an invention well
before filing a patent application, the determinative dates in a first-toinvent system are sometimes earlier than the corresponding dates under a
first-to-file system.186 This difference in dates can affect both the validity
examination by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
178. See, e.g., Sen. Franken, supra note 37.
179. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 22, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
180. Id. § 10 (providing reduced filing fees for applicants that are “micro entities”).
181. Id. § 3. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 102(g), with Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 3.
182. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(g). Conception occurs “‘when the inventor has a specific,
settled idea, a particular solution to the problem at hand . . . .’” Creative Compounds, LLC v.
Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). “In order to establish an actual reduction to
practice, the inventor must prove that: (1) he constructed an embodiment or performed a process
that met all the limitations of the interference count; and (2) he determined that the invention would
work for its intended purpose.” Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
183. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
184. Id. § 102(g).
185. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). Even
under the older first-to-invent system, some aspects of patent validity depended upon the filing date.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (referencing “the date of the application for patent”).
186. Under the old first-to-invent system, a patent applicant could use the patent application
filing date as the constructive date of conception and reduction to practice. Solvay S.A. v.
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and ownership of patents. For example, if a discovery was groundbreaking
on the date of conception but common knowledge by the time the inventor
filed a patent application, the inventor might be able to obtain a patent
under a first-to-invent system but not under a first-to-file system.187
Likewise, in a first-to-file system, the first person to file a patent
application will have priority and receive the patent.188 The outcome may
be different in a first-to-invent system, where the second person to file a
patent application will receive the patent if she establishes an earlier
conception date and demonstrates diligent reduction to practice.189
Proponents of the shift to a first-to-file system argued that a first-to-file
system was cheaper and faster to operate than a first-to-invent system in at
least two respects.190 First, because conception and reduction to practice
are fact-intensive issues, determining invention dates is complicated and
expensive.191 For example, “[c]onception is complete only when the idea is
so clearly defined in the inventor’s mind that only ordinary skill would be
necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or
experimentation.”192 As a result, determining conception requires detailed
investigation into the “inventor’s mind,” the level of “ordinary skill,” and
the difficulty of “reduc[ing] the invention to practice.”193 Moreover, much
information regarding these issues is not publicly available, such as the
inventor’s mental state prior to filing a patent application.
Challenges in determining invention dates under the first-to-invent
system can hamper the efforts of patent owners, patent examiners, and
Honeywell Int’l., Inc., 622 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
187. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (stating that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the
invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent . . . .”); id. § 103 (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains.”). Under the America Invents Act, some public disclosures up to
one year before the date a patent application is filed do not prevent an inventor from obtaining a
patent. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 3.
188. The America Invents Act also establishes new “derivation proceedings” that prevent a
person from obtaining a patent by copying an invention from an inventor and filing a patent
application before that inventor files a patent application. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 3.
Derivation proceedings, however, must be initiated “within the 1-year period beginning on the date
of the first publication of a claim to an invention . . . .” Id.
189. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); see also Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 629 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(awarding a patent to the first inventor to file a patent application because the second inventor to
file an application was not diligent in reducing his prior conception to practice).
190. Alexander Poltorak, First-to-File vs. First-to-Invent, WEALTH OF IDEAS NEWSL., Oct.
2007, at 40, available at http://www.generalpatent.com/ip_articles/Poltorak-IPToday-Apr2008.pdf.
191. Id.
192. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
193. Id.
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competitors to assess the validity of a patent or patent application.194
Likewise, near simultaneous inventors in a first-to-invent patent system
may incur substantial costs in resolving competing claims to the same
discovery.195 In contrast, determining priority dates in a first-to-file system
is quick and inexpensive. Patent filing dates are easy to identify and
published online.
A second reason that a first-to-file system may be cheaper than a firstto-invent system is that nearly every other patent office in the world uses a
first-to-file system rather than a first-to-invent system.196 Consequently,
proponents of the America Invents Act argued that the Act “would make it
easier for U.S. inventors to get innovations patented overseas because they
would not have to prepare applications for two different systems.”197
The America Invents Act also contains numerous provisions designed
to reduce the number of invalid patents issued by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office. For example, the America Invents Act creates a new
process through which third parties can submit information “of potential
relevance to the examination of [an] application,” including a statement
explaining the relevance of the information.198 Prior to the Act, U.S. patent
law allowed third parties to submit to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office “patents or publications relevant to a pending published
application” but prohibited third parties from including “any explanation of
the patents or publications, or any other information.”199 Expanding the
capacity of third parties to help the U.S. patent examiners evaluate patent
applications may reduce the number of invalid patents that the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office issues.200 The America Invents Act also may
improve the quality of U.S. patents by expanding the administrative
procedures available to third parties for challenging the validity of issued
U.S. patents. Even before the Act, a third party could challenge a U.S.
patent’s validity through an administrative process known as
reexamination, but U.S. patent law limited these proceedings in two
significant respects.201 First, reexamination could only address “a
194. See Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes—A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-toInvent,” 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 793 n.190 (1998).
195. Id. at 793.
196. Id. at 757.
197. Rep. Smith, supra note 4.
198. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
Submitted information must be in the form of “a patent application, any patent, published patent
application, or other printed publication . . . .” Id.
199. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.99(a), (d) (2012); see also 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (providing that, for an
issued U.S. patent, a third party may submit to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office “patents or
printed publications” and a statement of their relevance to the validity of the U.S. patent).
200. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PATENT REFORM IN
THE 112TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 19 (2011).
201. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–18 (2006).
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substantial new question of patentability,” thus excluding any validity
issues already considered in the initial examination of the patent.202
Second, third parties could not raise certain types of validity challenges in
reexaminations, such as asserting that a patent does not cover patenteligible technology.203 The America Invents Act creates a new “post-grant
review” procedure that lacks both of these limitations.204 In a post-grant
review, a third party will be able to assert any invalidity critique that could
be made in federal court.205 Post-grant review proceedings, however, can
only be initiated within nine months of a patent’s issuance.206 For
challenges after this initial time period, the America Invents Act replaces
the older reexamination procedures with a new administrative procedure
called “inter partes review.”207 Like the older reexaminations, certain
validity challenges cannot be raised in inter partes reviews, but in other
respects inter partes reviews are broader than reexamination. Significantly,
inter partes reviews are not limited to “substantial new question[s] of
patentability” like reexaminations; instead, third parties can raise, in inter
partes reviews, some validity issues that were already considered in the
initial examination of the patent.208
2. The Impact of Traditional Improvements on Incentives to Invent
At first blush, one might assume that making the processes at the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office cheaper, faster, and more accurate would
encourage U.S. entities to patent and ultimately to innovate. After all, U.S.
patents provide exclusive rights to inventions throughout the United States,
and—by a wide margin—American inventors receive more U.S. patents
than inventors from any other single country.209 For example, in 2011, the
U.S. Patent Office issued approximately 224,000 patents.210 American
inventors received about 109,000 of those patents.211 The second largest
number of U.S. patents issued to Japanese inventors, who received only
46,000 U.S. patents.212

202. Id. § 303(a); In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
203. In re NTP, 654 F.3d at 1275–76.
204. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 306–07
(2011).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 306.
207. Id. at 299.
208. Id. at 305.
209. See Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Patents By Country, State, and Year - Utility Patents
(December 2011), U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/
oeip/taf/cst_utl.pdf (last modified Mar. 21, 2012).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Moreover, all of the traditional improvements to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office can increase the value of U.S. patents. Reducing the cost
of obtaining U.S. patents increases their net value. Likewise, when U.S.
patents issue more quickly, innovators may be able to commercialize new
technology more quickly.213 Reducing the number of invalid U.S. patents
in circulation also can increase the value of valid U.S. patents because
invalid patents often decrease the returns from innovation. After a business
commercializes a valid U.S. patent, the business may be sued for allegedly
infringing an invalid U.S. patent. Even if an accused innovator litigates and
successfully demonstrates that a patent is invalid, such a successful legal
defense is expensive, in part because the innovator must prove that the
patent is invalid by clear and convincing evidence.214 These litigation costs
reduce the profits from valid U.S. patents.215 Alternatively, an innovator
“may choose to make payments under licensing arrangements, or perhaps
decide not to market its product at all, rather than contest the patent
proprietor’s claims.”216 Thus, traditional improvements to U.S. patent law
increase the value of U.S. patents. Because more U.S. patents issue to
American inventors than to inventors from any other country, these
improvements provide more benefit to American inventors as a group than
to inventors from any other country.
Nevertheless, for two reasons it is doubtful that reducing the cost,
duration, and inaccuracy of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s patent
application processing will increase incentives to invent in the United
States relative to the incentives for foreign inventors. First, traditional
improvements to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will help any
inventor when she obtains a U.S. patent, regardless of her nationality. For
example, if the America Invents Act reduces the cost of obtaining a U.S.
patent by $10, both foreign and domestic inventors will save $10 when
they apply for a patent. Moreover, an inventor who uses the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office more will receive greater benefits. If the cost of
obtaining a U.S. patent drops by $10, an inventor who obtains ten patents
will save $100, while an inventor who obtains five patents will save only
$50. Likewise, if the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office were to process
patent applications 20% faster, an inventor who previously would have
received only five patents would instead receive six patents, while an
inventor who previously would have received ten patents would receive
213. Inventors may also use issued U.S. patents to obtain capital that can be used to
commercialize new technology. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 642 (2002)
(discussing the use of patents as signals in capital markets).
214. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242
(2011).
215. Indeed, James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer have argued that “by the late 1990s,
litigation costs clearly exceeded the profits from patents outside the chemical and pharmaceutical
industries.” JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 140 (2008).
216. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 200, at 29.
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twelve patents. Similarly, if the value of U.S. patents increases by $10 per
patent because the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issues fewer invalid
patents, an inventor who obtains more U.S. patents will receive a larger
gain than someone who obtains fewer U.S. patents. In short, the traditional
improvements to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will magnify
existing disparities in the acquisition of U.S. patents.
Unfortunately, this magnification will not help American firms compete
against foreign rivals. Although American inventors obtain more U.S.
patents than inventors from any one foreign country, in global markets,
American firms compete against all rivals from all countries. For the past
four years, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued more U.S.
patents to foreign inventors on the whole than U.S. inventors.217 For
example, in 2011, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued 108,626
patents to American inventors and 115,879 patents to foreign inventors.218
If improvements to the procedures at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
increase the rate at which it issues patents by 10%, American inventors
would receive 10,863 more patents, while foreign inventors would receive
an even larger increase of 11,182 more patents. As a result, the
improvements to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office would extend the
lead of foreign inventors over American inventors by an additional 319
U.S. patents.
Similarly, foreign inventors would benefit more if the cost of obtaining
U.S. patents declines. If the cost of obtaining a U.S. patent in 2011 had
been $10 less, foreign inventors as a group would have saved more than
$30,000 more than American inventors. Improving the functioning of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may particularly disfavor American
inventors in technological fields in which foreign inventors obtain
substantially more U.S. patents than domestic inventors.219 Within these
217. Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2011, supra
note 96.
218. Id.
219. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office categorizes patents into approximately 400
technology classes, although this classification system “is based primarily on technological and
functional principles and is only rarely related to economists’ notions of products or well-defined
industries (which may be a mirage anyway).” Griliches, supra note 77, at 1666. In 2010, more U.S.
patents were issued to foreign inventors than domestic inventors in many of these classes. See
Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Patenting In Technology Classes, Breakout by Geographic Origin
(State and Country), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecstc/clstc_gd.htm (last modified Mar. 27, 2012). Some significant
technology classes in which U.S. inventors substantially trail foreign inventors in obtaining U.S.
patents include: Dynamic Information Storage or Retrieval; Dynamic Optical Information Storage
or Retrieval; Electrical Generator or Motor Structure; Electric Lamp and Discharge Devices;
Electricity: Motive Power Systems; Incremental Printing of Symbolic Information; Chemistry:
Electrical Current Producing Apparatus, Product, and Process; Television; Liquid Crystal Cells,
Elements and Systems; Optics: Image Projector; Photocopying; Facsimile and Static Presentation
Processing; Optics: Systems and Elements; Motion Video Signal Processing for Recording or
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fields, the magnification of patenting disparities discussed above would be
particularly dramatic. In other words, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office cannot save dying domestic industries by improving processes
contributing to their decline.220
The second reason that improving procedures at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office may not provide American inventors with relatively
enhanced incentives to invent is that domestic and foreign inventors may
respond differently to changes to U.S. patent law. For instance, American
and foreign inventors may face different costs in taking advantage of the
improvements to U.S. patent law. Some foreign inventors may be less
responsive to changes in U.S. law because these inventors face additional
transaction costs, including language and cultural barriers.221 Indeed, some
foreign inventors may be entirely unaware of improvements to U.S. patent
law. On the other hand, American inventors sometimes may be slower to
respond to changes to U.S. patent law. For example, even if the shift to a
first-to-file system ultimately improves the efficiency of procedures at the
U.S. Patent Office, American inventors may initially face additional costs
in that many U.S. inventors must learn the new first-to-file system.222 In
contrast, because almost every foreign patent system is already a first-tofile system, foreign inventors may not face similar obstacles.223 Even when
foreign and American inventors face similar transaction costs in
responding to changes to U.S. patent law, foreign inventors may react more
positively to those changes. Economic conditions may make some foreign
inventors more sensitive to changes in the cost of applying for a U.S.
patent.224 In a developing country, a $10 reduction in the cost of obtaining
Reproducing; Photography; Electrophotography; Radiation Imagery Chemistry: Process,
Composition, or Product Thereof. Id. In classes where U.S. inventors lag behind foreign inventors,
those foreign inventors frequently are from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, or Germany. Id.
220. As noted above, patent numbers are only proxies for innovation. See supra note 92 and
accompanying text. Even if foreign inventors receive more patents than U.S. inventors, U.S.
businesses might enjoy a competitive advantage if the U.S. patents obtained by U.S. inventors are
more commercially valuable.
221. See infra notes 321–326 and accompanying text.
222. Inventors cannot simply rely on their attorneys learning the new first-to-file system. For
example, to ensure that an inventor obtains a patent on a new discovery, she must be the first to file
a patent application. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. An inventor therefore must
understand the first-to-file system well enough to determine when to contact an attorney.
223. Michael Murray, Did Patent Reform Level the Playing Field for Foreign Entities?,
BNA’S PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Oct. 7, 2011 (arguing that the changes worked by the
America Invents Act had “several significant benefits for foreign inventors”); see also Duffy, supra
note 128, at 703–06 (noting that global harmonization of patent law may be suboptimal because of
differences between different countries, including culture).
224. The impact on different suppliers of changes in supply conditions will depend on the
elasticity of the supply curves. GRIMWADE, supra note 142, at 24. If foreign inventors are more
sensitive to changes in patenting costs, their supply curve for U.S. patents will be more elastic. If
domestic inventors are less sensitive to changes in patent costs, then their curve for supplying U.S.
patents will be less elastic.
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a patent may be more impactful than the same savings in the United States.
In such a situation, improvements in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
procedures might increase patenting by American inventors but increase
even more patenting in the United States by foreign inventors.
In sum, it is unclear whether typical approaches to improving the
processing of applications by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will
meaningfully increase the incentives for American entities to invent.
Improving procedures at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office should help
American inventors, but because many foreign inventors also use the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, such improvements will also help foreign
inventors, and therefore may not significantly affect American
competitiveness in global markets.225
C. Selective Improvements to U.S. Patent Law
Although general improvements to U.S. patent law may equally impact
incentives to invent for foreign and domestic inventors, more limited
changes to U.S. patent law may provide enhanced incentives to invent for
American inventors. To do so, changes to U.S. patent law must affect
foreign and domestic businesses differently. To achieve this differential
impact while avoiding explicit protectionism, U.S. patent law often must
leverage factors extrinsic to law. This Section explores potential
improvements to U.S. patent law that narrowly focus on situations in
which American inventors differ from their foreign rivals.
1. Reducing Patenting Costs for a Selective Group of Inventors
One potential way to provide enhanced incentives for American
inventors vis-à-vis foreign inventors would be to reduce the cost of
obtaining U.S. patents for a subgroup of patent applicants dominated by
U.S. inventors. Independent inventors form such a group. For example, in
2011, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued 15,890 patents to U.S.
independent inventors but only 6,572 patents to foreign independent
inventors—a difference of more than 9,000 patents.226 In fact, U.S. patent
law already charges lower patent application fees for independent
inventors,227 and the Patent Office’s website provides detailed information
225. The effect of the America Invents Act on U.S. competitiveness may also be affected by
certain inventor demographics. For example, inventors starting new businesses may focus on
obtaining patents in their home countries. If so, improving the workings of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office would favor U.S. inventors hoping to start new businesses without
simultaneously favoring foreign inventors. See supra note .
226. See Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Independent Inventors by State by Year, Utility
Patents Report, January 1, 1975–December 31, 2011, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/inv_utl.pdf (last modified Mar.
2012).
227. 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2006) (stating that an “independent inventor” shall have fees
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to assist independent inventors.228 This special treatment ultimately helps
more American inventors than foreign inventors. Further reducing the costs
of obtaining a U.S. patent for independent inventors accordingly might
improve incentives to invent more for American inventors than for foreign
inventors. Indeed, the America Invents Act establishes even lower fees for
particularly small and unsophisticated patent applicants.229 In addition, the
Act establishes a “Patent Ombudsman Program,” and the sole objective of
this program is “providing patent filing support and services to small
businesses and independent inventors.”230
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether favoring independent inventors in
U.S. patent law meaningfully helps American businesses compete in global
markets. To start, many patent law scholars dismiss the inventive
contribution of independent inventors and contend that contrary claims are
“frequently hyped and distorted.”231 For instance, in 2011, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office issued approximately 224,000 patents;232
independent inventors consequently accounted for only 10% of U.S.
patents. More generally, a provision of patent law that is designed to favor
American inventors because of their nationality may suffer from the
protectionist pitfalls noted above, even if it hides its protectionist features
behind other group selection criteria.233
2. Expediting Patent Application
Another potential way to provide relatively enhanced incentives for
American inventors may be to streamline and to improve patent processes
in particular industries in which American inventors and American
businesses already enjoy competitive advantages.234 Many factors affect
competition, and different countries are successful in creating competitive
“reduced by 50 percent”).
228. See Inventors Resources, OFFICE OF INNOVATION DEV., http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/in
dex.jsp (last modified July 10, 2012).
229. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316–318
(2011).
230. Programs, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation
/programs.jsp (last modified Sept. 9, 2012).
231. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 215, at 166; see GAMBARDELLA ET AL., THE VALUE OF
EUROPEAN PATENTS: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN INVENTORS 23 (2005), available at
http://www.alfonsogambardella.it/PATVALFinalReport.pdf (reporting that only 7.81% of European
patentees are self-employed).
232. Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Patents By Country, State, and Year—Utility Patents
(December 2011), supra note 96.
233. See supra notes 124–52 and accompanying text.
234. It is not entirely clear whether expediting innovation only within certain industries is not
protectionism. If the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office expedites only certain patent applications,
other applications may not be processed as quickly as they might have been. At the very least,
however, selectively expediting patent processes is not facially protectionist.
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advantages in different industries.235 For example, American companies
have been effective in producing medical equipment and
pharmaceuticals.236 Reducing the costs and delays of patents in these areas
should increase, to some extent, the incentives to invent within these
industries.237 Because American businesses already dominate these
industries, American inventors and American businesses may most
strongly feel the effects of these enhanced incentives to invent.
Recently, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has developed two
programs that streamline patent procedures in certain industries. In 2006,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office started the Accelerated Examination
Program, under which the Office accelerates the examination of
applications that are particularly amenable to faster resolution.238 To
qualify for this program, an inventor generally must pay an additional fee,
but the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office waives the requirement for an
additional fee if the invention “(i) [e]nhance[s] the quality of the
environment; (ii) [c]ontribute[s] to the development or conservation of
energy resources; or (iii) [c]ontribute[s] to countering terrorism.”239
Similarly, in 2010, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office implemented a
program to accelerate the patenting of inventions “pertaining to green
technologies including greenhouse gas reduction (applications pertaining to
environmental quality, energy conservation, development of renewable
energy resources or greenhouse gas emission reduction).”240 The program
intended to “accelerate the development and deployment of green
technology, create green jobs, and promote U.S. competitiveness in this
vital sector.”241 The program was limited to processing only 3,500 patent
235. PORTER, supra note 12, at 196–97.
236. Id.; Econ. & Statistics Div., WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., Patent Applications by
Field of Technology and Origin: Top Origins, 2005-2009, WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP.
INDICATORS 2011, 77 (2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2013) (reporting patent applications worldwide by field of technology from 2005 to
2009); Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Patenting In Technology Classes, Breakout by Geographic
Origin (State and Country), supra note 219 (reporting U.S. patents between 2007 and 2011 by
technology class and country of origin).
237. Currently, patents are not used a great deal in some industries, particularly software and
Internet firms. Graham et al., supra note 47, at 1290, 1292–93.
238. For example, to qualify for the Accelerated Examination Program, an inventor must file
an application electronically; the application must contain only a limited number of patent claims;
the inventor must agree to have an interview with the patent examiner; and the inventor must
provide a statement that a pre-examination search for prior art was conducted. U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 708.02(a) (8th ed., 9th rev.
2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html.
239. 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c) (2010).
240. Office of Patent Legal Admin., Green Technology Pilot Program, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/green_tech.jsp (last modified May 7,
2012).
241. Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office, The U.S. Commerce
Department's Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) will pilot a program to accelerate the
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applications and ended March 30, 2012.242 Nevertheless, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office likely will develop additional programs to expedite
patent examination in certain industries. The recent America Invents Act
gives the Director of the Patent Office the power to prioritize the
“examination of applications for products, processes, or technologies that
are important to the national economy or national competitiveness.”243 By
expediting the examination of inventions for “products, processes, or
technologies” in which American inventors already enjoy competitive
advantages, the U.S. Patent Office may be able to magnify those
competitive advantages.244
Although expediting patent examination within certain industries thus
may help American inventors, these potential benefits should be weighed
against four potential pitfalls. First, identifying which areas of technology
to expedite may be difficult. In some industries, American companies may
only have a competitive advantage in certain market segments. For
example, the U.S. commercial airplane industry may be well-positioned to
compete in the market for long-range commercial jets but not smaller,
short-range commuter jets.
Second, even when areas of U.S. competitive advantage can be
identified, American industries could lose that advantage regardless of
favorable patent laws. Reducing the cost and delay of patenting in certain
industries may encourage foreign inventors and businesses to focus on
these industries, speeding the decline of once-dominant American
companies.245 In that situation, expediting patent processes eventually
would magnify the competitive advantages of foreign inventors.
Consequently, to enhance existing domestic competitive advantage,
lawmakers likely would need to constantly monitor the performance of
American innovators and quickly change which industries are expedited.246
Third, even if the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office could implement a
system that effectively expedites patent processes in appropriate industries,
examination of certain green technology patent applications (Dec. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/09_33.jsp.
242. Sunset of the Patent Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan and a Limited
Extension of the Green Technology Pilot Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 77,979 (Dec. 15, 2011).
243. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 25, 125 Stat. 284, 337–38
(2011).
244. See infra notes 310–311 and accompanying text. This approach may also foster norms
that support innovation.
245. The impact of changes in patenting costs within certain industries will depend on the
cross elasticity of demand for foreign and domestic inventors. See supra note 224 and
accompanying text.
246. Indeed, because of the difficulties of foreseeing future changes related to technology,
technology-specific patent laws are often disfavored. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 47, at 98–99
(“The history of industry-specific statutes suggests that many fail because they are drafted with
then-current technology in mind and are not sufficiently general to accommodate the inevitable
changes in technology.”).
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other countries might enact reciprocal measures, thereby reducing
American prosperity. For example, the Korean Intellectual Property Office
might enact similar provisions to enhance the competitive advantage of
Korean inventors over American inventors within certain industries.
Finally, selectively expediting invention in certain industries may violate
TRIPs, which prohibits “discrimination” in the availability of patents based
on “the field of technology.”247 If so, countries that are members of the
World Trade Organization may seek sanctions against the United States for
expediting patent examinations within certain industries.
Because of these challenges to obtaining domestic competitive
advantage by expediting innovation, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
should be cautious in selecting industries in which to expedite patent
examinations. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office should only expedite
examinations in an area of technology following a careful analysis of the
resulting costs and benefits, including effects on competitive advantage.
One potential approach would focus on expediting examinations in a small
number of industries in which the United States appears to have a clear
competitive advantage. For example, between 2007 and 2011,
approximately 80% of U.S. patents on surgical instruments were issued to
American inventors.248 By focusing on technological areas in which U.S.
competitive advantage is clear, like surgical instruments, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office can reduce the likelihood of inadvertently
magnifying the competitive advantage of foreign inventors. Also, by
limiting the number of affected industries, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office would reduce both the chance of widespread retaliation by foreign
patent offices and the likelihood that a foreign country would invoke the
dispute resolution mechanisms of TRIPs. Unfortunately, if the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office expedited patent examination in only a small
number of technological areas, the competitive benefits to domestic
inventors and businesses would be limited.
IV. CHANGING U.S. CULTURE
Some have called for a change in U.S. culture to boost American
innovation.249 For example, economist Tyler Cohen has argued that, to
247. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 127, art. 27.1. This provision of TRIPs, however, relates to
“Patentable Subject Matter,” and therefore may not govern procedures for obtaining patents. Id.
248. Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Patenting In Technology Classes, Breakout by
Geographic Origin (State and Country): Class 606, Surgery (instruments), U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecstc/606clstc_gd.htm (last
modified Mar. 27, 2012).
249. “Culture” is difficult to define precisely. See GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S
CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK RELATED VALUES 25 (1980) (describing
cultural values as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one
human group from another”); Maike Didero et al., Differences in Innovation Culture Across Europe
4 (2008) (TRANSFORM Project Discussion Paper), available at http://www.transform-

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss2/1

38

Hubbard: Competitive Patent Law

2013]

COMPETITIVE PATENT LAW

379

obtain economic prosperity, we should “[r]aise the social status of
scientists.”250 President Obama made a similar appeal in his 2011 State of
the Union address: “We need to teach our kids that it’s not just the winner
of the Super Bowl who deserves to be celebrated, but the winner of the
science fair.”251 Innovation analysts likewise have argued that culture
“play[s an] indispensible role[] by training, inspiring, and motivating the
innovators of the future.”252 Because typical approaches to improving
patent law provide little relative increase in incentives to invent,
nontraditional uses of patent law should be considered, such as the use of
U.S. patent law to create a culture in the United States that fosters
innovation. In such a culture, inventors would receive social subsidies for
their work thereby increasing the incentives to invent vis-à-vis inventors
from other cultures.
A. Law and Culture
Because law and culture are interrelated, each can affect the other.253
For instance, racist cultural views contributed to the passage of laws
requiring racial segregation in education, while beliefs in equality
contributed to desegregation.254 Similarly, legal scholars have identified
complex interactions between law and norms, including numerous
mechanisms by which law may affect social norms.255 For example, de jure
eu.org/publications/documents/Differences%20in%20Innovation%20Culture.pdf (collecting numerous
definitions of culture used by sociologists); Stephen L. Mueller & Anisya S. Thomas, Culture and
Entrepreneurial Potential: A Nine Country Study of Locus of Control and Innovativeness, 16 J.
BUS. VENTURING 51, 58–59 (2000) (exploring the relationship between culture and entrepreneurial
traits).
250. TYLER COWEN, THE GREAT STAGNATION: HOW AMERICA ATE ALL THE LOW-HANGING
FRUIT OF MODERN HISTORY, GOT SICK, AND WILL (EVENTUALLY) FEEL BETTER 83 (2011).
251. President Obama, supra note 1.
252. ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 4; INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 8; KAO, supra note 12,
at 266 (discussing adjustments to American values related to innovation); PORTER, supra note 12, at
30, 113–15; DAVID SHENK, THE GENIUS IN ALL OF US: NEW INSIGHTS INTO GENETICS, TALENT, AND
IQ 144 (2010) (“It must not be left to genes and parents to foster greatness; spurring individual
achievement is also the duty of society. Every culture must strive to foster values that bring out the
best in its people.”); see also SCOTT BERKUN, THE MYTHS OF INNOVATION 117 (2010) (arguing that
culture impacts a society’s receptiveness to new ideas); CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 154, at 325
(“The culture that survives to direct the future of the planet will be one that encourages as much
creativity as possible . . . .”).
253. Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 37
(2002).
254. E.g., Va. Code § 22-221 (1950) (requiring racial segregation).
255. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 2 (2000) (describing multiple ways
that legal intervention can change social norms); Geisinger, supra note 253, at 68 (noting the effect
of motorcycle helmet laws on individual certainty of helmet safety); Timothy R. Holbrook, The
Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 591 (2006) (describing the social impact of
racial segregation on understandings of race relationships); Hubbard, supra note 165, at 390;
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 964–65, 1016 (1995)
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racial segregation in education likely affected behavior outside of schools
by reinforcing racist social norms.256
One important way that law can affect culture is by impacting the
“social meaning” of an activity.257 Many actions convey a social meaning
in that performing the action expresses certain attitudes and
commitments.258 Social meanings therefore form part of the costs and
benefits associated with an action, and some people will avoid performing
an action in order to avoid expressing the character traits, commitments, or
connotations associated with the social meaning of that action.259 For
example, at one point, smoking cigarettes may have expressed sensuality,
sophistication, and independence.260 At that time, more people were likely
to smoke because of those positive social meanings. Today, however,
many people associate smoking with deleterious health effects.261 Because
smoking has a more negative social meaning today, people tend to be less

(describing the efforts by the Soviet government to transform the social meaning of wearing a
helmet); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 342–
43 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, Attitudinal Theory]; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 349 (1997) (stating that laws can
both intentionally and unintentionally affect social norms); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 86–88
(1999) (listing ways in which normative behavior and positive laws are interrelated); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2043 (1996) (noting the
effect of civil rights laws on the social meaning of nondiscrimination); Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 923 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Roles]
(describing how laws may define social roles).
256. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“Segregation of white and colored
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”).
257. See Lessig, supra note 255, at 951 (suggesting that these laws can be used by individuals
or groups “to advance individual or collective ends”); see also Holbrook, supra note 255, at 591
(“[I]t is beyond cavil that ‘the linguistic meaning of governmental action can have a moral
impact.’”) (quoting Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1363, 1494 (2000)); Sunstein, Social Roles, supra note 255, at 949 (noting that
government may use vivid images and rhetoric as a means of affecting social norms).
258. Lessig, supra note 255, at 951 (defining social meaning as the “semiotic content attached
to various actions”); see also Sunstein, Social Roles, supra note 255, at 925–28.
259. Lessig, supra note 255, at 956–58, 1001; see also Harry Surden, Structural Rights in
Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1610 (2007) (“[S]ocial norms impose social costs . . . .”).
260. See Meghan Daum, Smoking’s Sinful Sensuality in Movies, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2007, at
A23 (discussing the connection between the portrayal of smoking and sensuality in film).
261. See Lessig, supra note 255, at 1029 (describing how smoking stands “at odds” with the
emerging health campaigns); Sunstein, Social Roles, supra note 255, at 926 (explaining that in the
United States as opposed to other countries, smoking cigarettes may signal “something relatively
precise and very bad” about an individual’s “self-conception” and “concern for others”); see also
Lessig, supra note 255, at 963, 1008 (noting that the perceived legitimacy of a law affects its
capacity to connect specific actions to broad norms).
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inclined to smoke.262
Perhaps the simplest way that law can affect the social meaning of an
activity is by criminalizing it. Such a law may give the activity a negative
social meaning.263 For example, criminalizing driving while under the
influence of alcohol (DUI—commonly called “drunk driving”) may cause
the social meaning of drunk driving to become more negative and therefore
may dissuade people from engaging in the prohibited conduct.264 In
addition to affecting social meanings, a law will also publicize a social
view. In a majoritarian government, a law criminalizing an activity
indirectly indicates that many people believe the activity already has a
negative social value.265 For example, a law criminalizing drunk driving
indicates that many people disfavor such behavior. Even if a DUI law does
not affect an individual’s personal evaluation of the meaning of drunk
driving, the law may affect that individual’s expectations regarding others’
beliefs. In the face of a criminal DUI statute, an individual may avoid
driving intoxicated to avoid social sanctions from others.266
Another way that law can affect the social meaning of an activity is by
“tying” that activity to another aspect of society that has an established
social meaning.267 For example, a proponent of a ban on flag burning may
claim that the ban will promote a widely held value like patriotism.268
Similarly, opponents to such a ban may claim that the ban would
undermine the different goal of liberty.269 Regardless of the truth of these
empirical claims, support for the ban can be influenced by its perceived
connection to patriotism or liberty.270 The success of an effort to affect
262. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
263. See Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a PreferenceShaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 37 (1990).
264. This understanding of the social meaning of crime perhaps explains why some people
assert that activities that are not crimes in fact are not crimes. For example, the website
http://www.privacyisnotacrime.com asserts that “privacy is not a crime . . . .” The website does not
contend that under the current law privacy is in fact a crime. Rather, the website contends that
people should have stronger rights to privacy. PRIVACY IS NOT A CRIME,
http://www.privacyisnotacrime.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2013); see also PHOTOGRAPHY IS NOT A
CRIME, http://www.photographyisntacrime.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2013); SKATEBOARDING IS NOT
A CRIME, http://www.skateboardingisnotacrime.com/extras (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
265. See Geisinger, supra note 253, at 64–65, 70; McAdams, Attitudinal Theory, supra note
255, at 358. This inference is undermined if some people cannot or do not vote or if the validity of
the vote count is suspect.
266. Law may also affect activities with positive social meanings. For instance, allowing
taxpayers to deduct charitable contributions from their taxable income may help give such
contributions a positive social meaning and may indicate that many people believe such
contributions already have a positive social meaning.
267. Lessig, supra note 255, at 1009.
268. POSNER, supra note 255, at 112 (noting the symbolism of honoring and desecrating the
flag).
269. Id.
270. Id.
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social meaning through tying therefore depends in part upon the perceived
legitimacy of the tying.271
Social meaning is closely linked to the concept of “salience,” which
describes the extent to which the public pays attention to an issue.272 “Due
to limited attention span, apprehension, and information processing
abilities, individuals can only process a small number of beliefs at any
single time.”273 New legislation can raise the salience of the issues
addressed by those laws, particularly if politicians discuss the legislation in
high-profile contexts.274 Moreover, tying can affect the salience of an issue:
associating an activity with a high-salience issue can increase that
activity’s salience.275 For example, a connection between the war on
terrorism, which arguably has high salience, and the war on drugs may
increase the salience of the latter.
B. Culture and Innovation
Culture affects competitive advantage in innovation in at least three
respects.276 First, countries may develop innovative industries related to
activities that are particularly important in that culture.277 “[N]ations tend
to be competitive in activities that are admired or depended upon; that is,
where the heroes come from.”278 For example, Americans’ love of sports
has likely contributed to the success of American businesses in producing
athletic products.279 The United States is home to the corporate
headquarters for three of the top four manufacturers of sporting equipment:
Nike, Reebok, and Under Armour.280 With national passions like this, a
271. Professor Lawrence Lessig has argued that when government attempts to change social
norms, there is a risk of causing an “Orwell effect: when people see that the government or some
relatively powerful group is attempting to manipulate [norms], they react strongly to resist any such
manipulation.” Lessig, supra note 255, at 1017; see also id. at 963, 1008 (noting that the perceived
legitimacy of a law affects its capacity to connect specific actions to broad norms). As a result of the
Orwell effect, the government may have an incentive to minimize the extent to which its message
seems to be from the government. Id. at 1017–18.
272. Geisinger, supra note 253, at 60.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 63 (noting that “passage of a law may not be the main source of information”
regarding a law and that “publicity about the reasons for the passage of law will be the main source
of information”); see also ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 159 (“The role of a nation’s leaders is to foster
the right environment for innovation through inspiration, funding, and policy.”).
275. See Geisinger, supra note 253, at 61.
276. This list is not exclusive; many factors potentially affect innovation.
277. PORTER, supra note 12, at 90–91.
278. Id. at 115.
279. Id. at 91.
280. See The Forbes Fab 40: The World’s Most Valuable Sports Brands, FORBES.COM,
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mlm45jemm/the-most-valuable-company-brands#content (last
visited Mar. 2, 2013); see also About Nike, Inc., NIKE, INC., http://nikeinc.com/pages/about-nike-inc
(last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (identifying the location of Nike’s corporate headquarters); Environment
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substantial portion of the domestic labor market may participate in the
activity, and domestic businesses therefore benefit from access to labor
with skills and knowledge tailored to the industry. Domestic businesses are
also well-positioned to monitor domestic consumer demand. Furthermore,
because domestic demand for industries related to national passions is
sophisticated, global demand trends may trail domestic trends.281 By
focusing on domestic demand, domestic industries related to national
passions are able to anticipate (and perhaps influence) changes in global
demand.282 “If prestige and national priority favor an industry, the ripple
effect on competitive advantage can be enormous.”283
The second manner in which culture can affect innovation is that some
societies foster “inventing norms,” which generate praise and respect for
innovators.284 In cultures with such norms, inventors receive additional
benefits from their discoveries in the form of enhanced social status.285
There are good reasons to believe that inventing norms are widely accepted
and enforced in the United States.286 For example, successful innovators in
the United Sates are often publicly praised.287 When Thomas Edison died,
President Herbert Hoover turned off all of the lights in the White House for
one minute.288 More recent examples of innovators who achieved celebrity
status include Bill Gates (founder of Microsoft, Inc.), Steve Jobs
(cofounder of Apple, Inc.), and Mark Zuckerberg (founder of Facebook,
Inc.). Reactions to the death of Steve Jobs in 2011 revealed the extent to
which he was widely esteemed even outside of technology circles. The day
he died, Jobs was praised by President Obama as “exemplif[ying] the spirit
of American ingenuity.”289 Mainstream media also praised Jobs as a
“visionary,”290 likening him to Thomas Edison, Henry Ford, and John D.
at
Headquarters,
REEBOK.COM,
http://corporate.reebok.com/en/corporate_citizenship/
environment_at_headquarters/default.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (identifying the location of
Reebok’s corporate headquarters); Careers, UNDER ARMOUR, http://www.underarmour.jobs (last
visited Mar. 2, 2013).
281. PORTER, supra note 12, at 86–90.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 115.
284. See Hubbard, supra note 165, at 373.
285. Id. at 378–82.
286. See BERKUN, supra note 252, at 111 (“Americans hold ingenuity to be one of the best
kinds of goodness . . . .”); see generally Hubbard, supra note 165, at 378–88 (discussing inventing
norms).
287. BERKUN, supra note 252, at 71 (“Innovators became easy heroes in America . . . .”).
288. Randy Alfred, Aug. 4, 1922: For Whom the Bell Tolls Not, WIRED (Aug. 4, 2010, 12:00
AM), http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2010/08/0804alexander-graham-bell-funeral-silence.
289. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Passing of
Steve Jobs (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/05/stat
ement-president-passing-steve-jobs.
290. John Markoff, Apple’s Visionary Redefined Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/business/steve-jobs-of-apple-dies-at-56.html?pagewanted=all.
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Rockefeller.291
A third way in which culture contributes to competitive advantage in
innovation also involves social norms. Inventing norms directly praise
innovation, but other social norms may encourage activities and values that
indirectly encourage innovation.292 For example, a society in which
education and hard work are lauded may produce greater numbers of
creative, educated, and skilled citizens,293 which may help domestic
businesses develop new technologies294 and create domestic demand for
those technologies.295
Finally, sociological studies have identified “innovation values,” which
are broad cultural characteristics that correlate with innovation. These
studies begin by determining the extent to which certain cultural
characteristics are present in some countries and absent from others, and
then correlate these characteristics with a country’s innovation output.296 In
291. Walter S. Mossberg, Mossberg: The Steve Jobs I Knew, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203476804576613732041665792.html?mod=
technology_newsreel; Patricia Sullivan, Steve Jobs Dies; Apple Co-Founder Was 56, WASH. POST
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/steve-jobs-apple-computer-cofounder-dies/2010/09/21/gIQAc14aOL_story.html?hpid=z1.
292. See ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 7–33 (arguing that certain values contribute to innovation).
Other social norms may hamper innovation. For example, social norms based on erroneous
stereotypes may dissuade women from pursuing careers in science and invention. See AUGUSTINE,
supra note 12, at 49 (“Women constitute 46% of the US workforce, but only 23% of the science
and engineering workforce.”); John P. Walsh & Sadao Nagaoka, Who Invents?: Evidence from the
Japan-US Inventor Survey 9 (RIETI discussion paper series, 09-E-034, 2009), available at
http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/09e034.pdf (reporting that only 5% of U.S. patentees are
women).
293. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 69 (“Patience, continuity, and their close relative
perseverance are all fundamental catalysts of successful innovation.”); BERKUN, supra note 252, at
172 (“Study the histories of great creators, and you’ll find a common core of willpower and
commitment as their driving force.”); CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 154, at 61 (noting that
creative, successful individuals are often tenacious workers); PORTER, supra note 12, at 114 (“In no
small part, a nation’s success depends on the types of education [that] talent chooses to obtain and
where it chooses to work.”).
294. ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 170 (“One of the most significant factors in deciding where to
locate an R&D center is a strong research community and talent base.”); Porter & Stern, supra note
79, at 29; Scott Shane, Cultural Influences on National Rates of Innovation, 8 J. BUS. VENTURING
59, 63 (1993) [hereinafter Shane, Innovation] (noting that “[i]nnovation requires skilled engineers
and scientists”).
295. PORTER, supra note 12, at 95 (“Provided it anticipates buyer needs in other nations, early
local demand for a product or service in a nation helps local firms to move sooner than foreign
rivals to become established in an industry.”).
296. See, e.g., Anneli Kaasa & Maaja Vadi, How Does Culture Contribute to Innovation?
Evidence from European Countries, 19 ECON. OF INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 583, 592 (2008);
Mueller & Thomas, supra note 249, at 51; Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 59–60; Scott A.
Shane, Why Do Some Societies Invent More than Others?, 7 J. BUS. VENTURING 29, 29 (1992)
[hereinafter Shane, Invent]; Hongyi Sun, A Meta-Analysis on the Influence of National Culture on
Innovation Capability, 10 INT’L J. OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP & INNOVATION MGMT 353, 354 (2009).
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determining national characteristics to test for correlations with innovation,
sociologists often rely on a system of cultural characteristics developed by
Geert Hofstede.297 For example, “individualism” is one of Hofstede’s
cultural characteristics.298 In highly individualistic cultures, people prefer
to act in the interests of themselves and their families rather than acting in
the interests of a larger group of people.299 Another important cultural
dimension that Hofstede developed is tolerance of “power distance,” which
describes the extent to which people from a country accept inequality in
power between people.300 A country that exhibits significant power
distance embraces hierarchy and resists change.301 In non-power distant
countries, “people believe in shared power, equality, and social
mobility.”302 Using survey responses from more than 88,000 people from
thirty-three different countries, Hofstede determined the extent to which
these countries exhibited certain cultural characteristics, including
individualism and power distance.303
Building on Hofstede’s work, sociologists have identified statistically
significant correlations between high levels of innovation304 and two
cultural characteristics: high levels of individualism and low tolerance of
power distance.305 For example, Scott Shane has identified a positive
correlation between per capita patenting rates and individualism, and a
negative correlation between per capita patenting rates and tolerance of
power distance.306 Although these studies demonstrate only correlations
297. See generally GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES
(1980) (describing Hofstede’s system for classifying cultures).
298. Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 60–61.
299. Id.
300. Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 30.
301. Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 61.
302. Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 31.
303. Id. at 30. A single country may contain multiple cultures, though Hofstede’s
categorization of countries does not reflect this possibility. Didero, et al., supra note 249, at 3.
304. Sociologists measure innovation in different ways. See, e.g., Kaasa & Vadi, supra note
296, at 588 (using patent applications in the European Patent Office); Mueller & Thomas, supra
note 249, at 52 (survey data); Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 64 (per capita trademark rates);
Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 30 (per capita patent rates); Sun, supra note 2966, at 353 (a
blended innovation index).
305. Kaasa & Vadi, supra note 296, at 592; Mueller & Thomas, supra note 249, at 59; Shane,
Innovation, supra note 294, at 67; Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 30 (per capita patent rates);
Sun, supra note 296, at 353 (analyzing whether Hofstede’s cultural characteristics correlate with a
“national innovation capability index”); see also ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 18 (arguing that
“openness” contributes to innovation); KAO, supra note 12, at 23, 59, 156 (same). But see Kaasa &
Vadi, supra note 296, at 592 (reporting that “individualism appears to have a much weaker or
nonexistent relationship with patenting intensity”).
306. Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 30. These correlations remain statistically significant
even when adjusted for wealth. Id. at 39. In a later study, Shane also considered whether
individualism and tolerance of power distance correlated with per capita trademarking rates. Shane,
Innovation, supra note 294, at 64, 65.
IN WORK RELATED VALUES
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between these cultural characteristics and innovation, these correlations
suggest that encouraging individuality and limiting power distance may
support innovation. Indeed, these results are consistent with other
scholarship arguing that autonomy, independence, and freedom facilitate
innovation307 and that hierarchy, inequality, and lack of communication
between superiors and subordinates slow innovation.308
C. Patent Law and Innovation Culture
Like other types of law, patent law can affect culture. In particular, its
effects on social meaning and salience can impact the cultural features
identified in the previous Section that correlate with competitive advantage
and innovation: national passions, inventing norms, and innovation values.
For example, the expressive aspects of patent law may affect which
activities are considered national priorities. As discussed above, under the
new America Invents Act, the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office has the power to declare that certain “products, processes, or
technologies . . . are important to the national economy or national
competitiveness.”309 Within these technological areas, the Director may
accelerate the processing of patent applications.310 By declaring that certain
areas of technology are national priorities, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office may improve the social meaning of working within those industries
and also increase the salience of those positive social meanings. Even if the
magnitude of these effects is not large, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office may be able to create marginal improvements in the social meaning
and salience of an industry, thereby marginally improving the incentives to
invent within that industry.311
Patent law also may affect social norms that favor and encourage
inventing. In an earlier article, I described in detail many ways that patent
law can influence these norms.312 Although I will not repeat those
arguments here, the recent changes to U.S. patent law in the America
Invents Act illustrate some of the ways that patent law may affect cultural
incentives to invent. To start, the signing of a law with a title that explicitly
307. ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 104 (“To take root, innovation requires flexible, open, less
hierarchical processes . . . .”); Kaasa & Vadi, supra note 296, at 585–87; Shane, Innovation, supra
note 294, at 61 (collecting sources); Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 33–35 (same).
308. Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 61 (collecting sources); Shane, Invent, supra note
294, at 31–33 (same).
309. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 25, 125 Stat. 338 (2011).
310. Id. For a critique of this approach, see supra notes 243–248 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 277–283 and accompanying text (discussing the competitive advantages
associated with national passions). But see infra notes 320–330 and accompanying text (discussing
concerns regarding the magnitude of the impact of U.S. patent law on U.S. culture).
312. See generally Hubbard, supra note 165. For example, awarding patents helps to enforce
inventing norms because a patent signals to a broad audience that the patent recipient has
discovered a new invention. Id. at 398–403.
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associates America with invention may increase the salience of invention
in American society, particularly given the current rarity of bipartisan
agreement.313
Furthermore, the Act may have also helped to give invention a positive
social meaning. This is because politicians have used the Act to connect
invention to economic prosperity, which possesses positive social meaning
and exceptionally high salience in the current economic downturn. When
the Act was introduced in the Senate, Senator Patrick Leahy asserted that
the Act is “a measure that will help create jobs, energize the economy, and
promote innovation.”314 Likewise, when the Act was introduced in the
House of Representatives, Representative Lamar Smith stated that “[t]his
legislation is crucial for American economic growth, jobs, and the future of
U.S. competitiveness.”315 After the Act passed both the House and the
Senate, President Obama quickly signed it, declaring that the Act will
“help give entrepreneurs the protection and the confidence they need to
attract investment, to grow their businesses, and to hire more workers.”316
News agencies widely repeated the asserted connection between the
America Invents Act and economic prosperity.317 The passage of the Act,
together with the statements of politicians regarding the economic goals of
the legislation, may help to give invention a positive social meaning,
thereby fostering a culture in the United States that is conducive to
innovation.
313. Peter Nicholas, Obama Signs Patent-Approval Law, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/16/nation/la-na-obama-patents-20110917. In the House of
Representatives, the Act passed with 304 supporting votes and only 117 opposing votes. Press
Release, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, House Passes Smith’s Patent
Reform Bill (June 23, 2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/news/Patent%20Reform%20Passes.html. In
the Senate, the bill passed by an even larger majority, with 89 votes in favor of the Act and only 9
votes opposing it. Edward Wyatt, Fighting Backlog in Patents, Senate Approves Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/business/senate-approves-overhaul-ofpatent-system.html.
314. 157 CONG. REC. S948 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Senator Orrin
Hatch similarly asserted that the legislation would “help strengthen our economy.” 157 CONG. REC.
S951 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
315. 157 CONG. REC. H4421 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith).
316. President Obama, supra note 39. In a press release issued the same day, President Obama
further asserted that the Act will “support job creation and strengthen America’s competitiveness in
the global economy.” Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Signs America
Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New
Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act -overhauling-patent-system-stim.
317. See, e.g., Michael A. Memoli & Peter Nicholas, Obama Signs Patent Overhaul Law,
Pushes Jobs Act, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/16/news/la-pnobama-patent-20110916 (noting that President Obama asserted that patent reform is “a commonsense step to boost the economy”); Darlene Superville, Obama Signs 1st Major Patent Law Change
Since 1952, Associated Press, Sept. 16, 2011 (reporting that the Act “has been hailed as a milestone
that will spur innovation and create jobs”).
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Finally, patent law can also support broad cultural values that correlate
with high rates of innovation, such as individualism and low tolerance of
power distance. For example, the treatment of independent inventors under
U.S. patent law supports these values. As noted above, U.S. patent law
provides independent inventors with significant assistance in obtaining
patents, and the America Invents Act increases this support.318 By singling
out and supporting certain inventors because of their independence, U.S.
patent law financially encourages “independence” and also expresses broad
public support for it. Similarly, these same provisions of patent law express
support for low tolerance of power distance because independent inventors
seek to prosper through the quality of their ideas, not through advantages
based on social hierarchy.319
D. The Magnitude of Cultural Effects of Patent Law
The impact of U.S. patent law on culture is likely larger in the United
States than in other countries for two reasons. First, U.S. law and the
actions of U.S. politicians provide more information regarding the opinions
of American voters than the beliefs of citizens of a foreign country because
democratic elections, to a certain extent, encourage politicians to conform
their behavior to their constituents’ beliefs.320 As a result, U.S. laws and
statements by U.S. politicians promoting invention signal that many
American citizens believe that invention is highly salient and imbued with
positive social meaning. A person in the United States therefore may be
encouraged to try to discover a new invention by the increased expectation
of praise for her efforts. In contrast, a U.S. law favoring invention would
be less likely to cause a person in China to expect praise from Chinese
citizens.
A second reason that the expressive impact of U.S. patent law is larger
in the United States than in other countries is that American citizens are
more likely than foreigners to learn U.S. law or scrutinize the actions of
U.S. politicians.321 U.S. citizens can more easily follow developments in
U.S. law through popular media and without the need for translation.
Moreover, the benefits from monitoring U.S. law (or costs from ignoring
it) are frequently greater for American citizens than foreign citizens
because much U.S. law has little extraterritorial impact and because only
U.S. citizens can vote disfavored U.S. politicians out of office.322 Citizens
318. See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text.
319. See Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 61; Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 31.
320. U.S. politicians may be concerned about other actions by foreign countries and their
citizens, including economic and military reactions to U.S. laws.
321. Many foreigners closely monitor U.S. politics, and increasing the salience of an issue in
the United States might raise the salience of the issue in another country, particularly if that country
enacts new laws in response to U.S. legislation.
322. It is a felony for a noncitizen to vote in a federal election in the United States. See 18
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of foreign countries may benefit less from efforts to understand U.S. law
because they are unaffected by those laws or unable to change them.
One group of foreign citizens nevertheless may be highly responsive to
the expressive impact of U.S. patent law: foreign applicants for U.S.
patents. These foreign citizens may closely monitor U.S. patent law and
may benefit from certain value-laden portions of the patent act, such as the
provisions favoring independent inventors. Indeed, the patenting behavior
of foreign inventors suggests that they often pay close attention to U.S.
patent law. One way for foreign inventors to obtain U.S. patents is by filing
U.S. patent applications directly with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office. Alternatively, a foreign inventor can apply for a patent in a foreign
country and then use that foreign patent application to file a so-called
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application in the United States.
Interestingly, the vast majority of foreign inventors do not obtain U.S.
patents by leveraging applications from their home countries into PCT
applications in the United States. Instead, most foreign inventors file patent
applications directly with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. For
example, in 2011, nonresident inventors filed 227,907 patent applications
directly with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office323 and only 81,441 PCT
applications.324
Even if foreign applicants for U.S. patents closely track U.S. patent law
and politics, however, the expressive impact of U.S. patent law likely will
be largest in the United States because the expressive impact of U.S. patent
law in the United States extends to non-inventors. For example, even
people who have never applied for a patent may laud a successful
innovator. The reaction to the death of Steve Jobs in mainstream media
demonstrates the extent to which even technophobes may respect
innovators.325 Furthermore, the social meaning of invention can affect
whether people strive to become inventors in the first place. Improving the
social meaning of invention among children and students may encourage
some of them to pursue inventive careers. The benefits of using U.S. patent
law to shape culture are thus larger in the United States than in any other
country.326
U.S.C. §§ 911, 1015(f) (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-3(c)(2)(C), 1973gg-5(a)(6)(A)(i), 1973gg7(b)(2) (2006).
323. IP Statistics Data Center, WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://ipstatsdb.
wipo.org/ipstats/patentsSearch (select “1a- Direct applications” as the “Indicator,” select “Resident
& non-resident count by filing office” as the “Report Type,” select “2011” for both values in the
“Year Range,” and select “United States of America” as the “Office”) (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
324. Id. (select “1b- PCT national phase entries” as the “Indicator,” select “Resident & nonresident count by filing office” as the “Report Type,” select “2011” for both values in the “Year
Range,” and select “United States of America” as the “Office”) (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
325. See Markoff, supra note 290; Mossberg, supra note 291; Sullivan, supra note 291.
326. Some foreign countries are actively trying to shape their culture related to innovation. For
example, in 2010 Malaysia established the Malaysia Innovation Agency, which is a governmental
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Nevertheless, it is difficult to measure the extent to which U.S. patent
law can affect culture in a way that promotes domestic competitive
advantage. “Values and norms are powerful forces for controlling and
directing human behavior,”327 but it is not clear to what extent U.S. patent
law can shape these values and norms rather than merely reflect them.328
Moreover, the cultural impact of certain aspects of patent law likely
diminishes over time. Today, the America Invents Act and the highpublicity attention that politicians have given the Act probably have
worked together to increase the salience of inventing in American society
and to ensure that the social meaning of invention is positive. However,
Congress cannot credibly pass a major patent reform bill ever year; when
laws are perceived as lacking legitimacy, they may have little impact on
culture.329 Furthermore, the America Invents Act changed U.S. patent law
entity whose responsibilities include “[p]romoting the culture of innovation in the public and
private and education sectors in Malaysia . . . .” Lee Tatt Boon, Attaining High Income Through
Innovation, 25 WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. REPORT 40 (2011).
327. Mueller & Thomas, supra note 249, at 58; accord SHENK, supra note 252, at 151 (“Our
cultural landscape directly affects whether and how people challenge themselves and others to
achieve.”).
328. Indeed, some expressive effects of law could undermine innovation. For example, some
scholars have argued that granting patents for academic discoveries undermines social norms that
encourage scientists to collaborate with each other. See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and
Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 239 (2006)
(arguing that there is a correlation between the rise in patent law and the continual decline in the
quantity and quality of scientific discourse); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the
Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 216 (1987) (recognizing the
disincentive for researchers guided by scientific norms to publish prior to patent protection); Jeremy
M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System Revealed, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 78
(2004) (attributing the increased secrecy by professors not seeking patents to a shift in normative
attitudes toward reciprocity and collegiality). The results of these studies are inconclusive. See
Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary Between Academic
and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 2239 (2009) (“[S]cholars may have been overly
concerned about the potential erosion of academic sharing norms . . . .”). The National Research
Council recently issued a report that concluded that “the expansion of faculty entrepreneurial
activity and institutional technology transfer activity at U.S. research universities has not seriously
undermined the core missions of knowledge generation and dissemination.” NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 40 (2011).
329. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 255, at 99 (discussing the relationship between the distrust
of the government and the internalization of the values of a law in the context of shaming
punishments); Geisinger, supra note 253, at 68 (describing the process of norm internalization
associated with popular understandings of wearing a motorcycle helmet); Holbrook, supra note
255, at 592 (noting the impact laws can have on individual perceptions of societal norms);
McAdams, Attitudinal Theory, supra note 255, at 358–59 (discussing the importance of
“legitimacy” in the expressive theory of law); see also Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and
Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1139–40 (2005)
(discussing law, norms, and legitimacy in the copyright context); Lucas Osborn, Instrumentalism at
the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 425 (2012) (discussing judicial decisions and
legitimacy).
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to be more consistent with the patent laws of other countries. As the patent
laws of more countries align, their cultural effects may do the same.330 In
the long run, the cultural impact of U.S. patent law therefore may not
provide enhanced incentives to invent in the United States if the patent
laws of other countries provide their citizens with similar advantages.
CONCLUSION
Innovation is critical to the success of American businesses in global
markets. Because patent law is an important mechanism for promoting
innovation, changes to U.S. patent law might create competitive
advantages for American innovators. Because both foreign and domestic
innovators use the U.S. patent system, one potential mechanism for
boosting domestic innovation is to favor American inventors explicitly
through protectionist patent laws. Though the United States has a long
history of embracing protectionist patent law, the costs of such
protectionism outweigh the expected benefits. Protectionism generally
reduces domestic welfare by raising prices for domestic consumers and by
insulating American businesses from the competitive pressures that drive
innovation.331 In addition, if the United States were to enact protectionist
patent law, the United States would violate international treaties, risking
retaliatory action by its trade partners.
Another potential mechanism for using U.S. patent law to create
domestic competitive advantage focuses on traditional approaches to
improving the processes of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: making
these processes faster, cheaper, and more accurate. U.S. political leaders
implicitly contend that the recent America Invents Act creates competitive
advantage in this fashion.332 Typical approaches to improving the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, however, likely will not provide American
entities with enhanced incentives to invent vis-à-vis foreign inventors
because more foreign inventors utilize the U.S. patent system than
American inventors. Most of the benefits to improving the U.S. patent
system would therefore be enjoyed by our competitors. Moreover, foreign
inventors may be more responsive to improvements at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office than American inventors.
U.S. patent law might nevertheless be able to increase relative
incentives for Americans to invent in the United States by selectively
improving the processing of patent applications for U.S. patents in
330. Some countries arguably have gone further than the United States in using law to promote
values related to innovation. For example, Finland has “enshrine[d] in law Internet access as a basic
human right . . . .” BEYOND E-READINESS, supra note 81, at 8.
331. PORTER, supra note 12, at 68 (“Nations succeed in industries where pressures are created
that overcome inertia and promote ongoing improvement and innovation instead of an easy life.
Nations fail in industries where firms stop the upgrading process.”).
332. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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technological areas in which American businesses and inventors already
enjoy competitive advantages. Such selective improvements could magnify
those existing advantages. However, implementing selective improvements
will not be easy. For example, it may be difficult to identify reliably which
areas of technology to target for improvements. Moreover, foreign
countries may retaliate by enacting similar measures, thereby
disadvantaging U.S. interests in global markets.
Because traditional improvements to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office may equally affect foreign and domestic inventors, policy makers
seeking to boost U.S. competitiveness should also consider nontraditional
approaches to U.S. patent law, such as the effect of U.S. patent law on U.S.
culture. This aspect of U.S. patent law likely affects U.S. businesses and
inventors more than their foreign rivals. In this way, changes to U.S. patent
law and related statements by U.S. politicians can help to foster a culture in
the United States that facilitates innovation. For instance, in signing the
new America Invents Act and declaring innovation to be a national
priority, President Obama may actually have helped to achieve that goal.
Unfortunately, however, verifying and quantifying the effect of U.S. patent
law on the values and beliefs of the American people—and thus on
American competitiveness—is exceedingly difficult if not impossible.
In short, adjusting U.S. patent law has little capacity to promote
domestic competitive advantage by increasing American inventors’
incentives to invent vis-à-vis the incentives felt by foreign inventors.
Protectionist U.S. patent law is likely futile. Traditional improvements to
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office benefit both foreign and domestic
innovators, so American businesses and inventors often gain little, if any,
relative advantage over foreign rivals. The cultural impact of U.S. patent
law is well-suited to favoring U.S. interests, but the magnitude of such
effects is unclear.
Given these limits, the United States should continue to explore
nontraditional approaches to U.S. patent law that can create domestic
competitive advantage. In addition, the United States should consider
generating domestic competitive advantage through adjustments to other
areas of law that also affect innovation, including immigration,333 tax,334
333. See INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 11 (arguing that the United States must
“[r]eform immigration to attract the best and brightest [science and engineering] students from
around the world and provide work permits to foreign [science and engineering] graduates of U.S.
institutions”); GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 53–54. The Washington Post
reports that “[i]mmigrants founded a quarter of all U.S. engineering and technology companies
started between 1995 and 2005” Vivek Wadhwa, They’re Taking Their Brains and Going Home,
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 2009. Despite this contribution, “the lumbering U.S. immigration
bureaucracy helps push [immigrants] away” from the United States. Id.; see also AUGUSTINE, supra
note 12, at 50 (“In fact, it can be responsibly argued that America’s scientific enterprise would
virtually cease to function without the foreign-born talent that makes up such a crucial part of it.”).
334. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 62 (“In the early 1990s, the United States ranked first
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education,335 and government expenditures.336 These areas of law are
important topics for future research on innovation and competitive
advantage. These areas of law, however, face an important challenge that is
often absent from patent law. Changes to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office do not require increases in federal spending because the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office is funded solely through “user fees,” including fees
paid by patent applicants.337 In contrast, changes to tax, education, and
government expenditures likely will require increased federal funding. In
an era of deep cuts to the federal budget, political leaders are reluctant to
increase any expenditures.338 On the other hand, because innovation is vital
to the U.S. economy, avoiding these expenditures may be risky. As one
innovation commentator has noted, “Our competitors have not been
standing still.”339 By the time the U.S. economy catches its breath, it may
find that it has fallen behind in the global race for economic prosperity.

among OECD nations offering tax incentives for R&D; but by 2004, it had fallen to 17th place.”);
INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 58–59 (arguing that the United States must “[e]nact a
permanent, restructured [research] tax credit”); KAO, supra note 12, at 37 (discussing tax credits for
research and development). Many states have enacted tax laws to promote innovation; see, e.g.,
State Enacts Credit for Life Sciences Businesses That Increase Tax Revenue, BIOTECH WATCH
(BNA) (Apr. 25, 2011) (discussing tax incentives for innovation in Utah); State Enacts Job
Incentive Program for Life Sciences in Redevelopment District, BIOTECH WATCH (BNA) (Aug. 16,
2011) (discussing tax incentives for innovation in Rhode Island); Wisconsin Enacts Legislation
Expanding, Creating Biofuel Production, Sales Incentives, BIOTECH WATCH (BNA) (June 11, 2010)
(discussing tax incentives for innovation in Wisconsin).
335. See Lechleiter, supra note 4; Zakaria, supra note 4 (arguing that “if we are to get the U.S.
back to work, we need . . . to rebuild American education”). Certain parts of the U.S. educational
system appear to be ineffective. For example, in 2007, one-third of high school students in
California failed to graduate. KAO, supra note 12, at 34; see also CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note
154, at 330 (“Clearly, the availability of training is crucial for developing any kind of talent.”).
336. INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 11; Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, USPTO Launches Small Business Innovation Research Pilot Program (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2011/11-61.jsp (describing a pilot program by the U.S. Patent Office
providing additional resources to certain innovative small businesses); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–
12 (describing the ownership of patents on inventions discovered using federal funding). According
to one commentator, when adjusted for inflation, “US federal support of research in the physical
sciences, mathematics, and engineering . . . has been stagnant for 2 decades.” AUGUSTINE, supra
note 12, at 58.
337. H.R. Rep. 109-372, at 5 (2005).
338. GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 26; see Eric Lipton, Lawmakers Trade
Blame as Deficit Talks Crumble, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/11/21/us/politics/lawmakers-concede-budget-talks-are-close-to-failure.html?pagewanted=all
(noting that the federal budget will decrease 1.2 trillion dollars over ten years beginning in 2013).
339. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 3, 10; see GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at
4, 33–34.
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Appendix A: Global Patent Applications, Patents, and Populations
in Absolute Numbers and Per Capita by Inventor’s Country in 2011

Japan

128

Patent
Applications
Filed
Worldwide342
472,417

U.S.

312

432,298

201,158

1,387

646

Country

340

Population341
(millions)

304,604

Per Million
Capita
Patent
Applications
3,696

Per
Million
Capita
Patents
2,383

Patents
Granted
Worldwide343

China

1,344

435,608

118,158

324

88

Republic of
Korea

50

187,454

97,714

3,766

1,963

Germany

82

172,764

72,346

2,114

885

France

65

65,349

34,766

999

531

Russian
Federation

142

31,433

22,177

221

156

U.K.

63

49,938

18,275

797

292

Switzerland

8

37,477

17,564

4,740

2,221

Italy

61

27,679

16,212

455

267

Netherlands

17

32,376

14,924

1,939

894

Sweden

9

21,480

10,905

2,272

1,154

Finland

5

11,516

5,827

2,138

1,082

Denmark

6

11,565

4,260

2,075

764

Israel

8

10,821

4,237

1,393

546

340 The World Intellectual Property Office uses the country of residence for the first inventor
listed on a patent or patent application to approximate inventor nationalities. Methodological
Information, WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/
statistics/patents/pdf/patent_stats_methodology.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). Strictly speaking, the
country of residence for an inventor is not the same as the inventor’s nationality and multiple
inventors with different nationalities often collaborate to discover new inventions. Nevertheless, the
country of residence for the first inventor likely serves as a reliable proxy for inventor nationality
because discrepancies between residences and nationalities and among multiple inventors will
generally offset one another.
341. Data: Indicators: Population, total, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
342. IP Statistics Data Center, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://ipstatsdb.wipo.org/
ipstats/patentsSearch (select “1 - Total patent applications (direct and PCT national phase entries)”
as the “Indicator,” select “Total Count by Applicant’s Origin” as the “Report Type,” select “2011”
for both values in the “Year Range,” and select the countries listed above for the values under
“Select Origin”) (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
343. IP Statistics Data Center, WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://ipstatsdb.wipo.org/
ipstats/patentsSearch (select “2 - Total patent grants (direct and PCT national phase entries)” as the
“Indicator,” select “Total Count by Applicant’s Origin” as the “Report Type,” select “2011” for
both values in the “Year Range,” and select the countries listed above for the values under “Select
Origin”) (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
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